Hitler and the Third Reich

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Hitler and the rise to power

Adolf Hitler had a greater impact on the history of the world in the twentieth century than any other political figure. Yet his background was unimpressive. The son of a minor Austrian customs official, with a limited education, no qualifications or experience of government, and a foreigner, he nevertheless achieved the position of Führer, or leader, of Germany, one of the most economically developed and culturally sophisticated nations in the world. So how did he manage it? Was his success primarily the product of personal qualities? Was it the message he was preaching? Were the Germans peculiarly predisposed towards him or his message, and if so why? Was his success dependent more on the historical context in which he was operating? Or was it rather precisely due to a favourable conjuncture of the man, the message and the moment? These are the questions that have preoccupied historians since the 1930s.

The most important personal qualities in Hitler’s rise to power were his sense of mission to convert the German people to his cause, his ability to convince others of that sense of mission through his oratorical skills, and his strength of will to see that mission through come what may. Historians have endeavoured to trace the source of his sense of mission and the ideas and values underlying his message to his youth in Austria. His autobiography, Mein Kampf, provides some evidence, but as a source it suffers from the serious disadvantage of having been designed to project an image of him as a political leader and, in fact, some of the material on his early life is unreliable. The most important original source on his youth is the account by his friend, August Kubizek, from whom we gather that even while still a teenager living in Linz, Hitler believed that he was destined for greatness, though at the time he imagined that his future lay in art or architecture. However, according to Kubizek, by the time he was living in Vienna, Hitler had developed an ‘immense interest in politics’ and it is clear that a number of his fundamental political views were formed during his early life in Austria.

According to Kubizek — whose comments are supported by statements in Mein Kampf — at this time, Hitler’s political thinking was dominated by his sympathy for the Pan-German form of nationalism which was prevalent among the German-speaking population of the Austrian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They felt under increasing threat from the rise of the Slavs. He had also developed an intense dislike of the Socialist Party for its class-based, anti-nationalist views. However, the most thorough examination of Hitler’s life in Vienna has shown that Kubizek’s claim that Hitler was already a strong anti-Semite is wrong. In her important study of Hitler in Vienna, Brigitte Hamann has shown, to the contrary, that Hitler had a number of Jewish acquaintances and used them to sell his pictures. Nevertheless, it is clear from Mein Kampf that Hitler was by this stage a great admirer of the Pan-German leader Georg von Schönerer, for whom racist antisemitism was a central element of his worldview. He also admired the Christian Social Party leader and mayor of Vienna, Karl Lueger, for whom antisemitism was an important propaganda weapon. Pre-war Vienna was saturated with antisemitism and Hitler devoted newspapers and pamphlets and regularly attended political meetings. Thus, it would be surprising if he had not acquired a general anti-Semitic outlook. However, it is clear that, before the war, his antisemitism had not yet acquired pathological intensity or become the key explanatory tool in his system of ideas that it did after 1918. Finally, according to one of the most detailed studies of his early years, it is also probable that in Vienna he had acquired his Social Darwinist view of life as a struggle for survival between the different races for the earth’s resources.

However, although his Vienna years had a formative influence, historians now agree that it was his wartime experience and, above all, the shock of defeat and the revolution of November 1918, that proved the turning point in his life. Hitler’s sense of identification with Germany was greatly reinforced by his service in a Bavarian regiment during the war and helps to explain his extreme response to Germany’s defeat and the revolution. The significance of the defeat, which Hitler experienced in a military hospital while recovering from a gas attack, was well brought out by Rudolf Binion in the best of the attempts by psycho-historians to explain Hitler’s personality. However, Binion’s analysis was seriously flawed by his misreading of Hitler’s response to the Jewish doctor who had treated his mother’s terminal cancer. Nevertheless, he brought out the extent to which the defeat and subsequent revolution represented an existential crisis for Hitler personally as much as for Germany itself. Hitler responded with a fierce hatred for those he blamed for the defeat and a strong desire for vengeance against those he regarded as Germany’s enemies, both internal and external.
Hitler entered politics by joining the German Workers Party, a small group with extreme right-wing views, in September 1919. The first important work on his early political career is Konrad Heiden's *Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus: Die Karriere einer Idee*, first published in 1932. Heiden was a journalist who had very good contacts in the Munich political scene and, while not always reliable, provided valuable insights into the early history of the Nazi movement. Indeed, the first section of Alan Bullock's biography of Hitler is heavily indebted to Heiden.

After 1945, following pioneering work by the American historian Reginald Phelps and the German Ernst Deuermann, one publication in particular transformed our view of Hitler's early political career. Albrecht Tyrell showed in his *Vom 'Trummler' zum 'Führer' that when Hitler joined the DAP he had no ambition to be the future leader of Germany; rather, this sense of his future destiny developed gradually during the period 1919-24 in response to his own experiences. Thus, far from pursuing a consistent and determined strategy to take over the leadership of the NSDAP, in the summer of 1921 Hitler found himself forced to act by the actions of others. Even then, the role Hitler envisaged for himself was not as the future leader of Germany but rather as the 'drummer' who would convert the German masses to the cause of Germany's rebirth, preparing the way for Germany's return to greatness under a national leader as yet unknown. Tyrell shows that Hitler's transformation from 'drummer' to 'Führer' came about through his response to two developments: the growing adoration of his followers and their projection of him as 'Germany's Mussolini', and his experience of the pusillanimity of the established Conservative and völkisch nationalist leadership in Bavaria during 1923, and particularly their behaviour during and after his abortive beer hall 'putsch' of November 1923. It was these two experiences that persuaded Hitler, during 1923-4, that he could and should become the future dictator. Tyrell's account of Hitler's development between 1919 and 1924 has important implications for our understanding of his behaviour in later periods.

If his deep sense of outrage and humiliation in 1918-19 had intensified his already existing sense of destiny, his self-confidence was reinforced further by the worldview he had acquired in the meantime and which fuelled his sense of mission. For he believed that he was following the 'laws of nature', a belief that acquired quasi-religious significance for him and from which, until the very last year of the war, he derived continuing reassurance that he was on the right track, working in accordance with 'Providence' and therefore bound eventually to succeed. Two historians in particular have drawn attention to this important aspect of Hitler's 'worldview': Peter Stern in his illuminating study of the relationship between Hitler and the German people; and Robert Pois, who interpreted Nazism as a 'religion of nature'.

Although by 1918 Hitler had already developed strong nationalist beliefs and had almost certainly adopted some of the antisemitic prejudices so prevalent in pre-war Vienna, it was during the years 1919-20 that he constructed the basic principles of his 'worldview', including its antisemitic core, with only the details subsequently being modified. The components of this worldview were not original; they were shaped by the mass of völkisch nationalist and antisemitic literature which saturated Germany in general and Munich in particular during the immediate postwar period, and which Hitler evidently absorbed, and also by lectures from and conversations with leading local völkisch figures, such as Gottfried Feder and Dietrich Eckart, and Baltic German exiles such as Alfred Rosenberg, whom Hitler came to know during 1919. It represented an amalgam of Pan-German nationalism, popular versions of Social Darwinism and vitalist philosophy, racism and antisemitism, all of which were current at the time. However, his worldview was given a particular edge by Hitler's personal experience, above all the defeat and revolution of November 1918.

Central to Hitler's worldview was his belief in the power of the human will, its ability to shape the world. Thus, at the core of his mission was a determination to restore and mobilize the will to power of the German people, infusing them with his self-belief, so that they would throw off the shackles of the Peace Treaty of Versailles and restore Germany to a position of power in the world. However, in order to do so, it would be necessary to eliminate the intellectual poison that for decades the Jews had been injecting into the German body politic and that was ultimately responsible for its recent defeat. Only then could 'heroic' values—more in accordance with 'nature'—be injected. Hitler found notions such as liberalism, democracy, internationalism, pacifism, humanitarianism and even Christianity 'unnatural'; they favoured the weak and untalented, and were encouraged by the Jews in order to undermine nations and make them vulnerable to Jewish control, in their drive towards world domination. The revolutions of 1918 and 1919 in central and eastern Europe had demonstrated that it was now 'Marxism', the product of the Jew, Marx, and 'Jewish Bolshevism', allegedly the product of Russian Jews, with their doctrines of class war, the dictatorship of the proletariat and internationalism that posed the biggest threat of all to Germany's recovery. These ideas and their supporters had been able to win over the German masses and so now became Hitler's main target. His message, therefore, preached first in the Munich beer halls and then to audiences throughout Germany, was the need to lure the masses away from 'Jewish Marxism' and substitute a national socialism, which would unite the nation and restore its will to power.

However, just as or even more important than the message was the medium and the context in which the message was received. For not only was Hitler exceptionally gifted at communicating his message, whether as a speaker or increasingly as the orchestrator and choreographer of the occasions on which he spoke, but also his audiences were exceptionally receptive. Thus, a central
issue for historians has been the receptivity of Hitler in Germany, and the connection between him and his message and the German people’s traditional beliefs and values, which was to form the ‘Hitler myth’.20

Historians have sometimes sought to explain Germans’ receptivity to Hitler and the fact that, of all the advanced states of the West, Germany proved uniquely vulnerable to such a figure and his movement, in terms of alleged continuities or alleged peculiarities21 in its history, the notion that Germany had pursued a Sonderweg or ‘special path’.22 There is an Anglo-Saxon and French historical tradition, which sees Nazism as rooted in a deeply problematic German history.23 A.J.P. Taylor, for example, writing at the end of the Second World War, considered that ‘the political traditions of Germany’ had been ‘in a state of decay since the time of Luther’.24 The Germans’ ‘national character’ had been shaped by their geographical position as ‘the people of the middle’; furthermore, ‘no other people’ had pursued extermination as a permanent policy from generation to generation for a thousand years. This perspective was shared to some extent by the most widely read book on the Third Reich published in English, William L. Shirer’s The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.25

However, there have also been more sophisticated German studies employing a continuity perspective. They began with the work of Fritz Fischer and his followers in the 1960s, which claimed that both before and during the First World War the German establishment was seeking European hegemony.26 According to Fischer, the German elites continued to harbour these ambitions during the Weimar Republic and into the Third Reich, where they provided the basis for an alliance of convenience with the Nazi leadership until the late 1930s, when the Conservatives became disillusioned by what they considered irresponsible Nazi foreign policy, which threatened war with Britain and France. These foreign policy ambitions were substantially related to internal problems, for which they provided a safety valve through the mechanism of social imperialism. These problems were the result of Germany’s failure to achieve a ‘bourgeois revolution’ and the resultant survival of ‘quasi-feudal’ and authoritarian political and social structures and values coinciding with rapid economic development. The result was a sharply divided society and the survival of reactionary elites, whose influence helped to undermine the democratic experiment of the Weimar Republic. Moreover, democratic development was allegedly weakened by a population of ‘unpolitical’ Germans frightened of conflict.27

However, it has now been convincingly demonstrated that in most respects Germany had undergone the transition to a bourgeois society by 1900, that Germans had a vigorous participatory political culture28 and even that they were ‘practising democracy’,29 albeit under a system with limited democratic control of the government.30 The dominant view among historians now is that the explanation for the Nazis’ success should be sought more in the exceptional burdens placed on the political system by the defeat and revolutionary events of November 1918 and the economic crises, first of hyper-Inflation in 1922-23 and then of depression in 1929-33.

Although this is broadly convincing, it is clear that there was a degree of continuity in terms of the interests and aspirations of certain elites, notably the Prussian Junker landed nobility and the military, whose role in undermining the Weimar Republic cannot be denied. Moreover, it has been argued that, while Germany did not follow a ‘special path’ before 1933, nevertheless, in many respects Hitler was ‘representative’31 of his time and place, or at least of substantial elements within it. This representativeness was in part a product of his reflection of values and mentalities that were, if not exclusively, then peculiarly German and particularly prevalent among the Protestant middle class.32 They were rooted partly in nineteenth-century Romanticism – the emphasis on authenticity, commitment, living experience (Erlebnis), the cults of Nature and of the will – and partly in Germany’s political history – the worship of the ‘power state’ and admiration of realpolitik,33 an extreme nationalism encouraged by the pride but also the sense of vulnerability of a new nation-state: a militarism deriving originally from Prussia but reinforced and made ubiquitous by a process of national unification involving three successful wars led by Prussia; and a liberal tradition that was flawed by its ambivalent relationship with the state and the people, and a contempt for Enlightenment values and their application to politics as ‘western’ and ‘sentimental’ (Humanitätsstilisierung). Moreover, Hitler was the heir to a long German tradition of ‘heroic’ leader worship.34

In his recent stimulating study Germans into Nazis, Peter Fritzschke emphasizes how Hitler’s promise of national regeneration, restoring a united, ethnically based ‘national community’, and social reform had a wide appeal in a nation whose deep social and religious divisions had recently been overcome in the euphoria of August 1914, only to be reopened even more sharply by the defeat and revolution of November 1918.35 In this view Hitler was a populist articulating widespread frustration with the established order and a yearning for national unity and revival.

Fritzschke’s emphasis on Nazism as a ‘program of cultural and social regeneration promised on the superordination of the nation and the Volk’ accords with recent work on fascism by Roger Griffin.36 Griffin has shifted the focus away from the emphasis in the Marxist definitions of fascism as the product of a crisis of capitalism for which ideology functions merely as propaganda to stress the importance of fascist ideology, the core of which he sees as a myth of national rebirth.

Finally, historians’ concern with the relationship between Hitler and the German people, coupled with the new emphasis on the role of ideas and mentalities as historical forces in recent years, has encouraged a revival of the notion of Nazism as a ‘secular religion’, a notion that was first put forward in the late 1930s by the German Catholic philosopher Eric Voegelin and the
French intellectual Raymond Aron,47 However, what was perhaps crucial above all in explaining Hitler's success was the fact that at critical junctures the political situation was highly favourable to him and his movement. Hitler and the Nazi movement's success was restricted to two discrete periods of the Weimar Republic – 1919–23, when it was limited very largely to the state of Bavaria in general and its capital Munich in particular, and 1929–33.

In its early years the NSDAP benefited enormously from the fact that, during most of this period, Bavaria had an extreme right-wing government which tolerated, if not encouraged, its activities and a population embittered by the revolutionary events of 1918–19, among whom antisemitism was virulent.48 This period came to an end with Hitler's unsuccessful putch of 8–9 November 1923 and the period 1924–28 saw only slow progress with the 1928 Reichstag election producing an NSDAP vote of only 2.8 per cent. However, an invaluable collection of documents with commentary by Albrecht Tyrell and an important monograph on the Nazi Party by Wolfgang Horn have illuminated how, nevertheless, these years saw the development of Hitler's charismatic form of leadership and the consolidation of the community of völkisch activists behind it.49 Hitler's authority as Führer and his success in conveying his sense of mission were indispensable for maintaining the cohesion and commitment of a party composed of such disparate and aggressive elements during a period in the political wilderness. It meant that if a crisis occurred, the party had a cadre of dedicated followers and activists ready to take advantage of it.

It was indeed the economic crisis of 1929–33, and the breakdown of the democratic system under its centrifugal political pressures, which created the opportunity for Hitler successfully to project his message of national revival under his leadership that proved so attractive no longer just to völkisch activists but to a desperate people.50 Even so, with 37 per cent of the vote in the Reichstag election of July 1932 Hitler's popular support had peaked. Analysis of who voted for Hitler was transformed by Jürgen Falter in Hitler's Wähler, who, having processed a mass of electoral statistics, concluded that Nazi support was broad-based but had "a middle class stomach".51

Hitler's failure to secure power after the July election produced a serious crisis in the party during the autumn and winter of 1932, putting its future in doubt. In this instance, Hitler's uncompromising belief in his destiny and refusal to accept the compromises urged on him by some of his subordinates worked to his advantage. For he was saved by the intervention of members of the traditional German elite, who were determined to avoid a return to democratic politics and looked to Hitler to provide a public relations operation for their authoritarian regime.52 In his important detailed study of these events, Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, Henry Turner assigned degrees of responsibility for Hitler's appointment as Chancellor to the handful of individuals involved and argued that it was by no means inevitable.53

Hitler and his regime44

The regime that Hitler established in Germany after his takeover of power in 1933, the so-called 'Third Reich', was primarily responsible for a war that killed over 50 million people and entirely responsible for genocidal campaigns which involved the deaths of millions of Slav civilians, some six million Jews and hundreds of thousands of Romani, so how can we explain the regime's extraordinarily destructive quality? Were its lethal actions the more or less direct result of the policies, initiatives and decisions of its leader Adolf Hitler? Or did they derive from the nature of the regime itself? And, if so, how far was the particular character of that regime related to Hitler himself and his role within it? These are some of the questions which have preoccupied historians since Hitler's first appearance on the political stage in the 1920s, and they have adopted a variety of perspectives on him and his regime, reflecting their different methodological approaches, methodologies and interests.55 More generally, the problem for historians has been the need to avoid the twin pitfalls of either following the 'great man' school of history and placing too much emphasis on Hitler's role, thereby ignoring the constraints imposed by the political, economic and social contexts in which he was obliged to operate, or, alternatively, of portraying him as the puppet of anonymous political structures or economic and social forces, and thereby understating his power and his ability to exercise it independently and decisively on important issues.

For Marxist historians Hitler and the Third Reich tended to be subsumed under the concept of 'fascism', which before the war became increasingly narrow and reductionist, culminating in the notorious definition of Georgi Dimitrov, approved by the 1935 Comintern congress, namely that fascism constituted 'the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital'. This definition, which reduced Hitler to a mere tool of capitalism, largely determined the approach of historians in the post-war Soviet Bloc until its demise in 1989. Thus, two of the leading historians of the former German Democratic Republic saw Hitler as the 'star agent' of 'the most extreme monopolists' of big business, while they saw his Mein Kampf as performing the role of a 'testimonial to the great captains of industry'.56

While more sophisticated versions of the Marxist approach, notably the work of August Thalheimer and Otto Bauer,55 influenced by Marx's The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, were prepared to concede that Hitler and the Nazi regime possessed a measure of autonomy, the latter were still seen as essentially a function of the crisis within the capitalist system. Indeed, even the two outstanding pre-1945 studies of the Third Reich, Ernst Fraenkeli's The Dual State and Franz Neumann's Behemoth, both written by Marxist-influenced historians,
accord Hitler little significance. Thus, while Neumann devotes a section to charismatic leadership, it is largely theoretical and historical and he devotes no space to Hitler’s actual role as Führer. And, given his statement that ‘the decisions of the leader are merely the result of the compromises among the four leaderships’ – the army, the party, the bureaucracy and ‘Monopolistic Industry’, one can understand why.\(^{49}\) Similarly, despite the subtitle of his work, ‘Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship’, Fraenkel not only fails to deal with Hitler’s role, but does not even refer to him in the index!

In addition to the Marxist perspective on Nazism, the pre-war period also saw the development of another intellectual model of explanation in the shape of totalitarianism. The term was first used by liberal, democratic and socialist critics of Italian fascism in the 1920s, notably Giovanni Amendola and Lelio Basso, who were the first to assert the totalitarian character of both fascism and Bolshevism.\(^{50}\) The creation of the new term was designed to reflect what was considered the radical novelty of the new Fascist, Nazi and Bolshevist movements and regimes that had emerged in the inter-war period. Two aspects appeared particularly striking: the extreme and dynamic quality of the violence they had unleashed and the fact that they had introduced a new kind of politics, no longer subject to constitutional, legal or traditional restraints, and not confined to the public sphere, but rather claiming the total domination of every aspect of human life.

Even before 1945, the totalitarian model was beginning to influence perspectives on Nazism and the Third Reich, for example, Fraenkel’s distinction between the ‘normative’ and the totalitarian ‘prerogative’ state, both of which, existing side by side, made up the ‘Dual State’. And in Behemoth Neumann defined a set of five ‘principles of National Socialist organization’ foreshadowing the totalitarian model of the 1950s: a) the replacement of the pluralistic principle characteristic of democracy by ‘a monistic, total, authoritarian organization’; b) the atomization of the individual; c) ‘differentiation and elite formation’ in various party organizations; d) the ‘transformation of culture into propaganda’; and e) violence, which was ‘the very basis upon which society rests’.\(^{51}\) But significantly he did not include the leader figure.

However, it was during the 1950s that the totalitarian model came to provide the main intellectual framework for the analysis of Nazism and produced some outstanding work by a number of German scholars, notably Karl Dietrich Bracher’s magisterial analysis of the collapse of the Weimar Republic, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik;\(^{52}\) the superb study of the Nazi takeover of power by Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer and Gerhard Schulz, Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung;\(^{53}\) Hans Buchheim’s work on the SS;\(^{54}\) \(^{55}\) and Bracher’s excellent The Nazi Dictatorship.\(^{56}\) Unlike the political scientists, who were formulating more or less static models, a Procrustean bed of specific characteristics,\(^{57}\) the work of these German historians was grounded in solid research and they were using the totalitarian model flexibly to emphasize features that marked out the Third Reich from other political systems. Thus, for Bracher, ‘in contrast to the Communist dictatorship, Nazi totalitarianism lived and died with the Leader and the Leader principle’.\(^{57}\)

However, during the 1960s, the totalitarian approach came to be challenged on two fronts. First, the publication of Ernst Nolte’s Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche\(^{58}\) in 1963 marked the beginning of a return to the concept of fascism, which was then enthusiastically adopted by historians associated with the strong left-wing movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, who revived various Marxist formulations from the inter-war years.\(^{59}\) The totalitarian model was now contemptuously dismissed as a propaganda product of the Cold War. But, with the notable exception of the contributions of Tim Mason,\(^{60}\) this work tended to operate at a very abstract level, be dominated by more or less crude Marxist dogma, and so provided few new insights into the Third Reich. In particular, it had nothing new to say about Hitler and his role.\(^{61}\)

This gap was only partly filled by the appearance in 1973 of the first serious biography of Hitler to appear since Alan Bullock’s of 1952, Joachim Fest’s Hitler.\(^{62}\) It was brilliantly written and full of persceptive comments about Hitler’s personality and his relationship with German society, but despite his assertion that ‘the eruption he unleashed was stamped throughout almost every one of its stages, down to the weeks of final collapse, by his guiding will’, it had very little to say about Hitler’s role within the power structure of the regime.\(^{63}\) Fest’s book initiated a so-called ‘Hitler Wave’ in the shape of a flood of biographical-type publications of generally inferior quality. These included a number of ‘psycho-historical’ studies endeavouring to explain Hitler’s personality in terms of various alleged traumas induced by such events as the circumstances of his mother’s death or his alleged monorchism and then to use these theories to explain his policies and actions.\(^{64}\) However, apart from the fact that the evidence on which these theories were based was sometimes erroneous, such theories invariably suffer from the impossibility of verification and, in any case, provide very inadequate explanations of major policies and decisions, such as his decision to go to war or the Holocaust, which can only be properly understood within the political context in which they occurred. Thus, while it is clear that Hitler’s personality played a significant part in his career, it is questionable how far psycho-history can help us to understand it and its actual role except in terms of more or less plausible speculation.

The second major challenge to the totalitarian model came from a slightly younger generation of German scholars, who, from the middle of the 1960s, began publishing major studies of various organizations and institutions within the Third Reich.\(^{65}\) The challenge was particularly evident in the appearance of Martin Broszat’s important study of the workings of the Third Reich, Der Staart
Hitlers in 1969, the same year as Bracher’s Die Deutsche Diktatur. For, while Bracher had emphasized the centrality of Hitler, Broszat, despite the title of his book, placed the emphasis away from Hitler’s personal role and concentrated more on the extent to which his position was both determined and limited by the ‘chaotic’ nature of his rule.

In fact, by the mid-1970s, some members of this younger generation of German scholars were dividing into two rival schools and becoming engaged in an increasingly acrimonious academic dispute, focusing on the role of Hitler within the regime. On the one side, there was a group who came to be called ‘intentionalists’, or ‘traditionalists’, who, like Bracher, emphasized the importance of Hitler in determining the policies and actions of the regime. For them, Nazism could be described as ‘Hitlerism’. On the other, there were the ‘structuralists’, ‘functionalists’ or ‘revisionists’, who emphasized the ‘polycratic’ structure of the regime, in which Hitler’s role was no doubt very important but by no means always decisive. They considered Hitler as essentially a propagandist who became effectively a prisoner of the amorphous political system he had established, of the social forces he had unleashed, and the goals in the form of slogans he had proclaimed.

As far as the issue of ‘totalitarianism’ was concerned, the polarization was to some extent artificial, produced by the caricaturing of the position of those who used a totalitarian model. Thus, they had never in fact regarded the Third Reich as ‘a monolith’. Indeed, since the Nuremberg trials and the publication of fragments of the Goebbels Diaries in 1948, and since the appearance of memoirs such as those of the former civil servant Walter Petwaich, entitled The Authoritarian Anarchy, and of the former governor of German-occupied Poland, Hans Frank, who referred to ‘the chaos of leadership and responsibilities in every sphere’, nobody could seriously regard the Third Reich as being in any sense monolithic. Indeed, from Fraenkel and Neumann in the 1940s to Arendt and Friederich in the 1950s, historians and political scientists were well aware of the ‘polycratic’ features of the Third Reich. Indeed, as Dieter Reibentisch has pointed out, the term ‘polycratic’ as a description of the Third Reich was first used not by one of the ‘structuralist/functionalist’ historians but by Gerhard Schulz, who disapproved of the way in which his term was being applied or interpreted. Moreover, Martin Broszat himself used the term ‘totalitarian’ to describe the dynamic Nazi elements within the Third Reich in contradistinction to the traditional ‘authoritarian’ elements.

Thus, by the 1970s there was in fact broad agreement among historians about the ‘chaotic’ way in which the regime operated, and where the two schools differed was in their interpretations of the reasons why and its impact on the development of the regime and specifically of Hitler’s role within it. Bracher, Schulz and the ‘intentionalists’ considered that the ‘chaos’ strengthened Hitler’s position. For

the Leader was the sole figure standing above the confusion of jurisdictions and command chains; on him rested the hopes of almost all concerned, National Socialists and non-National Socialists alike, and this tied them to the regime. He was the supreme arbiter whose omnipotent position was for ever reaffirmed, through all the rivalries of party officials, all conflicts between state and party, Army and SA, economy and administration; by playing up one against the other and apparently supporting each, he was able to preserve and strengthen his position of power.

In other words, the regime’s polycratic structure was the prerequisite for Hitler’s monocratic power. Moreover, according to Bracher – and in this he followed a number of participants in these events – this system was ‘a largely conscious technique of rule’, a policy of ‘divide et impera’. Others who share the view that the antagonisms built into the system were intentional attribute this to Hitler’s ‘Social Darwinist’ views, his belief that the toughest and most effective individuals and organizations will emerge through struggle.

Broszat, on the other hand, argued that, while the ‘chaos’ of the system permitted Hitler to acquire a wide measure of autonomy,

because of the multiplicity of conflicting forces the Führer’s will (even when Hitler had something different in mind) was ultimately only able to influence events in this or that direction in an uncoordinated and abrupt fashion, and it was certainly not in a position to watch over and curb the new organisations, authorities and ambitions which developed as a result.

Mommssen went even further by claiming that Hitler ‘was unwilling to take decisions, frequently uncertain, exclusively concerned with upholding his prestige and personal authority, influenced in the strongest fashion by his current entourage, in some respects a weak dictator’.

To some extent, this division of opinion reflected the different aspects of the regime with which these various historians were engaged. Thus, in the sphere of foreign affairs, research appeared to demonstrate the crucial significance of Hitler’s role in policy- and decision-making, whereas the structuralists/functionalists tended to work on domestic affairs, where the responsibility for policy and decisions was much more opaque and where actions and decisions appeared to be strongly influenced by the ‘chaotic’ way in which the system operated and where Hitler was often only marginally involved, if at all.

Hitler’s most recent major biographer, Jan Kershaw, has tried to overcome the problem of relating Hitler to his regime by placing the emphasis on the ‘character of his power – the power of the Führer’. This power derived not only from his personal characteristics and was not only exercised by him personally; it sprang above all from the relationship between him and his
followers. Kershaw explains this relationship in terms of Hitler’s charisma, that is to say on the willingness of his followers to regard him as exceptionally gifted, possessed of a calling and imbued with a mission to save Germany from the crisis in which it was embroiled. This charismatic relationship encouraged his followers to fulfill what they believed to be his will. In other words, given this situation, it was unnecessary for Hitler to involve himself in many matters; once he had set the general direction of policy in any given area, he could then rely on his subordinates to carry it out by ‘working towards the Führer’. This emphasis on the relationship between the regime and the German population operating through the process of charisma had earlier encouraged Kershaw to focus attention on Hitler’s image as the crucial factor in underpinning popular support for the regime, specifically on the nature and construction of that image.

**Ideology and practice**

Apart from trying to assess Hitler’s role in the regime, historians have also considered, first, how far Hitler himself and the regime in general were ideologically driven, committed to pursuing a political programme derived from a more or less coherent ideology, or how far he was merely interested in power for its own sake. Second, they have examined how far the lethal character of Nazism derived from the conscious pursuit of its ideological aims or how far it was rather a consequence of the system itself, and also what the relationship between these two factors may have been.

Even the most sophisticated Marxist-influenced historians have tended to see Nazi ideology primarily in functional terms, as a means of preserving the capitalist system. Ernst Fraenkel, for example, differentiating between the notions of ‘substantial rationality’ or the rationality of ends and ‘technical rationality’ or the rationality of means, claimed that German capitalism has preferred an irrational ideology, which maintains the existing conditions of technical rationality, but at the same time destroys all forms of substantial rationality. If such substantially irrational ideology is useful to capitalism, the latter is ready to accept the programmatic aims of this ideology.

Similarly, Franz Neumann argued that ‘National Socialism has no political theory of its own’ and that ‘the ideologies it uses or discards are mere *arcana dominationis*, techniques of domination’. The German leadership was ‘the only group in present German society that does not take its ideological pronouncements seriously and is well aware of their purely propagandist nature’. In particular, Neumann saw racism and antisemitism as ‘substitutes for the class struggle’, as ‘an integrating element’ for the Nazis’ proclaimed ‘national community’. This view then led him to the assumption that ‘the internal political value of Anti-Semitism’ would never allow a complete extermination of the Jews. For the enemy ‘must always be held in readiness as a scapegoat for all the evils originating in the socio-political system’. Moreover, Neumann also explained the external aggression of the regime in terms of the contradictions within ‘totalitarian monopoly capitalism’. Thus, according to him, it was ‘the high productivity of the industrial apparatus, the pressure for foreign markets and the need for satisfying the vital material interests of her masses that have driven Germany into a policy of conquest and will continue to drive her to still further expansion’.

A functionalist view of Nazi ideology was shared by an influential pre-war commentator on Nazism from the other end of the political spectrum, Hermann Rauschnig, a disillusioned former Nazi leader, who was basically a Prussian Conservative. Shocked by what he regarded as the destructive features of Nazism: its lack of principle, its ‘hostility to the intellect, to individualism and personality, to pure science and art’, its contempt for all ethical values and traditions, he saw Nazism as ‘action pure and simple, dynamics in vacuo, revolution at a variable tempo ready to be changed at any moment. One thing it is not – doctrine or philosophy.’ The doctrine was merely an instrument for the control of the masses. Thus, racialism was ‘its make-believe; the reality is the revolutionary extremism revealed not in its philosophy but in its tactics’. Moreover, according to Rauschnig, the revolutionary elite could ‘maintain itself in power only by continually pushing on with the revolutionary process’. Thus, motivated purely by opportunism and incapable of creative political action, Nazism was, in this perspective, a ‘revolution of nihilism’ carried out by a Machiavellian politician and his party cronies. This view of Hitler as a modern form of tyrant was also shared by his first post-war biographer, Alan Bulloch, who saw him as ‘an opportunist entirely without principle’, ‘barren of all ideas save one – the further extension of his own power and that of the nation with which he had identified himself.

In 1969, Karl Dietrich Bracher, while taking aspects of Hitler’s ideology seriously as motives for action, nevertheless attributed some of the external dynamic of Nazism to pressures built into the system. Thus, according to him:

the absolute subjugation to the leader principle made possible the push beyond the borders. The forces pent up in the quasi-military Führer and coercive state found a surrogate for their urge to move, a reason for their subjugation, a chance of becoming themselves leaders and wielders of power in the promulgation of race policies, in imperial expansion, and in the exploitation of ‘inferior’ peoples. The oppressed became oppressors, the subjugated became the master race which, though unable to govern itself,
could govern others. The solution to the problem of freedom and control posed by the leader theory of National Socialism thus lay in the diversion to the outside of the natural need for political growth and freedom. Racial and political persecution and war became the psychological safety valves and tools of self-affirmation, expansion, and social imperialism, the substitutes for internal reform and self-fulfilment.87

A decade later, however, confronted with the structuralist/functionalist challenge, Bracher insisted: ‘it was indeed Hitler’s Weltanschauung that mattered in the end’.88

Despite the later conflict between Bracher and the structuralist/functionalist historians concerning the importance of Hitler’s role, Bracher’s earlier view of the significance of the relationship between the nature of the regime and the social forces within it for explaining the Third Reich’s dynamic had certain parallels with the structuralist/functionalist position. For Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen, in particular, warnings against explaining Nazi policies in terms of the systematic pursuit of Hitler’s ideological goals. For this would reduce the reality of National Socialism to the arbitrary actions of a single man and his mania. Instead, they attribute the destructive force of Nazism primarily to the operation of the regime itself.

They argue that, as a charismatic ruler whose power was based on his successful mobilization of the aspirations, fears and resentments of a substantial section of the German people, Hitler was obliged to project a set of inspirational fixed ideas.89 But such ideas needed to be vague in order to hold together so disparate a movement with such varied interests. In positive terms, Hitler promised national and social renewal and a return to great power status, negatively the elimination of internal enemies and external constraints. However, the regime proved incapable of constructing a new rational and enduring social order because of the conflict between its often contradictory, largely irrational and utopian visions and the reality of powerful and entrenched social and economic interests and cultural values. Instead, it was capable only of undermining existing structures through a process of parasitic absorption and dissolution.

In view of this, and in order to satisfy the Nazi activists and sustain the momentum essential to his form of regime and the social forces that underpinned it, Hitler was forced to focus on the negative aspects of his ideology, on eliminating ‘enemies’, all that was ‘foreign’, ‘abnormal’ or ‘unnatural’, points on which, broadly speaking, both activists and most ‘ordinary Germans’ could agree. For in Broszat’s words, the Nazi regime could not halt the ‘movement which was its law if it was not to lose the plebiscitary social dynamic which had been set in motion and thereby render itself superfluous. For only further action could ensure the integration of the antagonistic forces’.90

Hans Mommsen introduced another concept to explain the internal dynamic within the regime, which produced an increasing radicalization of policy and action, namely ‘cumulative radicalisation’.91 According to this argument, the polycentric nature of the Third Reich with its individual leaders, organizations and institutions competing for power, which in practice meant for the support of the Führer, ensured that the most extreme and radical option would tend to be adopted in order to prove its advocate’s loyalty and commitment to what were regarded as his goals.

Thus, Hitler’s policies and measures had ‘nothing to do with planned action’. Indeed, the Nazi leadership was incapable of grasping the implications of its two central goals proclaimed by Hitler, namely the winning of ‘living space’ in the East and antisemitism; they were essentially ‘symbols’ for Nazism’s internal and external dynamic, for ‘a movement which was in reality geared to an endless progression and accumulation of power’. Broszat points out that before the war there had been no serious planning for the implementation of the ‘living space’ objective, while antisemitic policy had been a series of ad hoc and sometimes contradictory measures whose only common theme had been the need to remove the Jews from German society ‘one way or another’; but there was no plan to exterminate them. Thus, for Broszat, while the ‘Jewish Question’ was primarily a ‘symbol for the unmitting domestic struggle’, until 1939/40 the aim of winning living space in the East largely had the function of an ideological metaphor, a symbol to justify ever-increasing diplomatic activity in order to achieve “the final destination” of total national freedom. According to his view, Hitler found himself finally forced to implement these goals which ‘objectively only had significance as ideological instruments for the mobilization of militancy and a belief in the future’ and in doing so ‘the movement literally brought itself to an end’ through an unsuccessful war.92

However, many historians have concluded that Hitler did possess a more or less coherent ideology on which he based a political programme, developed in the early 1920s, to which he remained committed, and which governed his major policies. The first to mount a serious challenge to the view that Hitler was simply an unprincipled opportunist bent on achieving maximum power was Hugh Trevor-Roper. Writing in 1953, he insisted that Hitler was neither a mere visionary nor a mere adventurer after power, but rather ‘a systematic thinker’ who had put together ‘a consistent philosophy’, however repugnant, and in his Mein Kampf had ‘published in advance a complete blueprint of his intended achievement’.93 In 1969, Trevor-Roper’s ideas received support from the first systematic analysis of Hitler’s ideology by Eberhard Jäckel, based largely on Mein Kampf, which emphasized its relative coherence.94 However, unlike Trevor-Roper, who had focused mainly on its imperialist aspects with only brief references to the racial and specifically anti-Jewish elements, Jäckel
stressed the significance of the goal of acquiring ‘living space’ and a lethal antisemitism as the core components.

Meanwhile, in a major study of Hitler’s strategy during the crucial years 1940–41, published in 1965, Andreas Hillgruber distinguished between, on the one hand, a programme, whose core was clearly outlined and which was directed at a goal that had been defined long before, and, on the other, a long-term plan. In his definition a programme could be subject to modification in response to unforeseen situations and the moves of opponents, whereas, by implication, a plan was inflexible. He argued that Hitler had aimed to avoid the mistake made by pre-war Germany of pursuing a continual and a world (colonial) policy simultaneously, thereby provoking Germany’s encirclement by Britain, France and Russia, by following a strategic programme divided into two main stages. In the first stage he had intended to establish German dominance over continental Europe on racial principles and then, in the future, exploiting Europe’s resources, to challenge the United States for world hegemony.

Hillgruber’s notion of Hitler’s strategy being governed by a ‘plan in stages’ (Stufenplan) did not receive universal acceptance. In particular, there has been controversy over whether Hitler’s aims were limited to securing hegemony over the European continent and establishing Germany as a world power or whether he was aiming for world dominance. Nevertheless, the idea that Hitler was following consistent foreign policy objectives was substantially reinforced by a series of works on other related topics such as Nazi colonial policy, naval policy and Hitler’s megalomaniacal architectural projects. Geoffrey Stoakes’s most thorough study of the development of Hitler’s foreign policy programme, published in 1985, stressed ‘the remarkable degree of consistency between Hitler’s declared aims in the 1920s and the course of Nazi foreign policy’ and that, ‘whilst by no means impervious to “structural” pressures from within Germany and from outside’, it was largely determined by Hitler’s convictions about Bolshevism and the pursuit of living space in the East.

Hitler and the Holocaust

Whereas in the field of foreign policy ‘intentionalist’ historians have tended to have the field largely to themselves, in explaining Hitler’s role in the Holocaust, the debate between intentionalists and structuralists/functionalists has been long and acrimonious. During the first post-war years, there appeared to be a simple explanation for the Holocaust: Hitler was a rabid antisemite and he was dictator. However, the first major study of the Holocaust, Raul Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews, placed it in a much broader context. Hilberg saw the Holocaust as ‘the culmination of a cyclical trend’ in the historical experience of the Jews and its implementation as essentially a bureaucratic process based partly on historical precedents and facilitated by the historically formed negative image of the Jews. Thus, the Nazis did not begin a development; they completed it. The bureaucracy waited only ‘on the signal from above’; in fact, ‘it needed no prodding’. After the SA pogrom of November 1938 the bureaucracy took over in order that the measures against the Jews could be taken systematically. And it was ‘the bureaucratic destruction process which in its step by step manner led to the annihilation of five million victims’. Through a process of improvisation and innovation the bureaucrats created a system involving four key stages: definition, expropriation, concentration and destruction. In this perspective Hitler’s role in the process was essentially limited to having created the right climate. For ‘in the right climate’ the bureaucracy ‘began to function almost by itself’.

A decade later, the American historian Karl Schleunes insisted that ‘the road to Auschwitz’ was not straight but ‘twisted’. During the period 1933–38, far from pursuing a systematic policy, Hitler’s role was ‘a shadowy one’ and, as a result of his failure to give a clear direction, subordinates pursued rival policies producing ‘a trial and error’ approach to the ‘Jewish problem’. However, Schleunes considered that ‘it was the Jew who helped hold Hitler’s system together on the practical as well as on the ideological level’. For antisemitism provided a safety valve for the unfulfilled revolutionary aspirations of his followers. But:

this situation, which Adolf Hitler had created for himself, made the Jewish problem and the promise of its solution a functional necessity. When such a necessity was supported also by the convictions of a Hitler and a Himmler, there could be no retreat. The search had to continue whatever the obstacles. Out of these circumstances emerged the logic of the boycott and, finally, of the extermination camp.

This picture was confirmed by Uwe Adam, who insisted that:

one cannot speak of a planned and co-ordinated policy in this sphere, that an overall plan concerning the nature, content and scope of the persecution never existed, and that it is even highly probable that the mass killing and extermination was not an aim that Hitler had set a priori and that he had tried to achieve.

Indeed, according to Adam, Hitler avoided intervening directly in the Jewish Question as far as he could. It was only in the context of the growing internal disintegration of the regime and of the war against the Soviet Union that the Jewish Question increasingly acquired an integrating and legitimizing role.
for the regime and that Hitler could take the decision to exterminate the Jews.

The issue of Hitler’s role in the Holocaust was given a particular urgency for historians by the claim in 1977 by the amateur British historian, David Irving, that Hitler was not even aware of the extermination of the Jews, at least until 1943, and that it was implemented by Himmler and Heydrich without his knowledge. While Irving appeared to be adopting elements of the functionalist approach, the two leading German functionalist historians determined to refute him, while at the same time setting out a more detailed functionalist explanation of the Holocaust.

Martin Broszat accepted that Hitler’s ideological will was an essential component of the Holocaust, but insisted on the need to elucidate ‘how this ideology became transformed into practice and the conditions and institutions through which it was mediated and possibly also distorted’. Unlike Adam, he argued that the extermination was not the result of a single decision, but rather was implemented in stages and in parts. On the one hand, by encouraging his subordinates to rid their areas of Jews, Hitler initiated a competition among them to see who could render his territory ‘free of Jews’ the fastest. On the other hand, as a result of unexpected logistical problems caused by the war in the East, the Nazi leadership began to seek a way out of the cul-de-sac into which they had manoeuvred themselves by beginning to exterminate the Jews in Poland rather than, as originally planned, deporting them to the Soviet Union. Once these ‘ad hoc’ decisions to exterminate specific groups of Jews had been taken they soon became systematized and institutionalised by the SS. Within the context of a general climate of opinion in which Jews were being treated as ‘sub-human’ and as threats to the German war effort, this process ultimately developed into a comprehensive programme to exterminate all Jews. Thus, while agreeing with Irving that the extermination of the Jews was in part ‘a makeshift solution’, and, while believing that, given the lack of evidence of a specific order from Hitler, Hitler’s responsibility for the Holocaust can be established indirectly only; nevertheless, Broszat insisted that the proofs of it are ‘overwhelming’. They are based on Hitler’s position of absolute power, the subservience to him of Himmler and other subordinates, and the enormous logistical and military implications of such a massive project, which could only have been authorized by Hitler. He speculated that whatever decisions Hitler took would have been made orally with Himmler.

For Hans Mommsen the real problem in explaining the Holocaust lay less with Hitler than with ‘understanding the overall political and psychological structure that gave rise to it’. He conceded that Hitler was ‘decisively responsible for the escalation of persecution’, but insisted that ‘the initiative rarely came directly from him. He was not concerned with detailed moves to achieve the desired “solution of the Jewish question”’. This was related to ‘his visionary concept of politics in which antisemitism was less a question of concrete political measures than of a fanatical ideological approach. Consequently, the regime failed to develop a coherent strategy until Heydrich took control of Jewish policy into his own hands’. Hitler ‘felt bound to stand by the party and SS, institutions whose members took literally the “grand” historical perspective presented them by Hitler’. He became ‘the slave of his own public prophecies’. Thus, while Mommsen conceded that Hitler was ‘the ideological and political author of the Final Solution’, he claimed that ‘it was translated from an apparently utopian programme into a concrete strategy partly because of the ambitions of Heinrich Himmler and his SS to achieve the millennium in the Führer’s own lifetime and thus to provide special proof of the indispensability of the SS within the national socialist power structure’. Himmler ‘directed a large part of his energies towards a programme that, for Hitler, had a low priority in comparison with the conduct of the war’. Antisemitic initiatives acquired their own momentum through the process of ‘cumulative radicalisation’. Thus, Mommsen rejected the idea that Hitler launched the Final Solution through a direct order, for ‘the bureaucratic machinery created by Eichmann and Heydrich functioned more or less automatically… There was no need for external ideological impulses to keep the process of extermination going.’

The British historian Gerald Fleming responded to Irving’s denial of Hitler’s responsibility for the Holocaust with an attempt to gather all the available evidence concerning Hitler’s knowledge of and involvement in the Final Solution. While Fleming did not find ‘the smoking gun’ in the sense of a direct order from Hitler, he did find enough indirect evidence of Hitler’s decisive role to be persuaded to adopt an extreme ‘intentionalist’ approach. For he concluded that Hitler was bent on exterminating the Jews from the beginning of his political career: ‘the line that leads from these early manifestations to the liquidation orders that Hitler personally issued during the war… is a direct one’. Hitler’s ‘unbroken continuity of explicit utterances was reflected in a more or less tacit continuity of deeds’.

While few historians have been prepared to accept such an extreme ‘intentionalist’ perspective, there has been a widespread assumption that, in view of Hitler’s supreme power, a decision from him would have been necessary at some point in order to launch a project of such huge moral and material dimensions. However, opinions have differed on dates and on the factors that might have prompted the decision. More recently, however, partly as a result of a large amount of detailed research on the extermination process in the East, a consensus is in the process of emerging. Now, many historians have come to accept that, while Hitler pursued from the start a consistent policy of trying to rid Germany of Jews ‘one way or the other’, Nazi policy developed in response to shifting priorities and changing conditions from social marginalization and economic deprivation to forced emigration and finally to extermination, without
following any clear or coherent plan of action. Nor did Hitler give a single order for the extermination. It is more likely that, through his public and private statements, he prepared the lethal climate for Jews within which the Holocaust became possible and also the legitimation for it. An important result of this research has been to emphasize the significance of ideology in the motivation of the leading SS personnel involved. At the same time, however, by giving instructions for particular actions and by encouraging subordinates to use their initiative, Hitler played a crucial role in sustaining the momentum of persecution. Moreover, the nature of the regime itself with its ‘totalitarian dynamic’, and the conditions in the East during the war, which proved so conducive to the development of the extermination process, were to a large extent the product of Hitler’s own agenda and actions. Thus, while Martin Broszat was correct in insisting that Hitler’s ideology alone cannot explain the Holocaust, and that one needs to examine the conditions within which the institutional instruments through which it was transformed into reality, nevertheless, one needs only to attempt to write Hitler out of the script to appreciate that he was the essential actor in the tragedy.

Notes
2. See, for example, B.F. Smith, Adolf Hitler: His Family, Childhood and Youth (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1967).
5. ibid., pp. 178ff.

14. On the origins of Hitler’s ideology, see the judicious assessment in Kershaw, Hitler, pp. 60ff. For the period in Vienna, see also Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna.
18. It is impossible to be certain what Hitler read during these years, but apart from the ‘classic’ works of German völkisch nationalism such as Houston Stuart Chamberlain’s Die Grundlagen des Neuen Jahrhunderts, Theodor Fritsch’s Handbuch der Judenfrage, and Heinrich Class’s Wenn ich der Kaiser war, one or more of which he may even have read before the war, Munich was saturated with völkisch and antisemitic literature (books, pamphlets and newspapers) published by, among others, the E. Lehmann Verlag (Deutschlands Erneuerung), the Tiroler Society (Münchener Bnebacher), the Deutschnationalen Schutz- und Trutzbund, and Dietrich Eckart (Auf gut Deutsch), all of which regurgitated in various forms the basic topoi of German völkisch and antisemitic thought. Hitler seems to have been particularly impressed by Gottfried Feder’s linking of antisemitism with his economic theory of the need ‘to break the slavery of interest’ and his distinction between ‘productive’ and ‘parasitic’ capital. Hitler heard Feder lecture in his Munich University indoctrination course.
23. See, for example, R.D.O. Butler, Roots of National Socialism 1783–1933 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941); W.M. McGregor, From Lenin to Hitler: The History of
30 The most powerful critique was mounted by Blackbourn and Eley in The Peculiarities of German History. See also J. Thomas, Nippers, 1933 and the Continuity of the German Reich, ed. H.W. Koch (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 489–508.
31 See Stern, Hitler: The Führer and the People.
33 According to the historian Friedrich Meinecke, 'Specifically German...was the frankness and nakedness of the German power state and Machiavellism, planned and deliberate formation as a principle of conduct and the present taken in its reckless consequences'; F. Meinecke, The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 14–15.
34 See Kershaw, The Hitler Myth, pp. 13ff.

49 Neumann, Behemoth, p. 383.

50 See Maier, "Totalitarismus", 391ff.

51 Neumann, Behemoth, pp. 327–8.

52 Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik*.


63 Ibid., p. 3.


66 Broszat, *The Hitler State*.


70 Bracher, *The German Dictatorship*, p. 269.

71 Ibid.


76 See Kershaw, *The Hitler Myth*.


78 Neumann, Behemoth, p. 381.

79 Ibid., p. 276.


81 Ibid., p. 31.

82 Ibid., p. 19.

83 Ibid., p. 15.

84 Ibid., p. 32.

85 In fact, Raunshning was subsequently to revise this view and take Hitler’s ideology more seriously. See Schreiber, *Hitler Interpretationen*, pp. 144–8.


89 For the following, see Mommsen, *Nationalsozialismus*, idem, *Adolf Hitler als Führer der Nation* (Tübingen: Deutsches Institut für Fernstudien an der Universität Tübingen, 1984); and Broszat, *Soziale Motivation*.

90 Broszat, *Soziale Motivation*, p. 408.

91 H. Mommsen, *Kumulative Radikalisierung und Selbstzersetzung des Regimes*, in *Meyer Enzyklopädisches Lexikon*, vol. 16 (Mannheim, 1976) and idem, *Cumulative...*

92 See Broszat, 'Soziale Motivation', pp. 407ff.

93 H. Treuen-Börner, 'The Mind of Adolf Hitler', in Hitler's Table Talk: Hitler's Conversations Recorded by Martin Bormann (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953), pp. viii-ix. However, it was not until 1959, when Treuen-Börner expressed these views in a lecture to an international conference that they received scholarly attention through the published version entitled 'Hitler's War Aims'. Significantly, once more the focus was on Hitler's imperialism; indeed, this time there was no mention of the Jews. See H. Treuen-Börner, 'Hitler's Kriegeziele', Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 8 (1960), 121-33, translated in Aspects, ed. Koch, pp. 235-50.


95 A. Hillgruber, Hitler’s Strategic: Politik und Kriegführung 1940-41 (Frankfurt am Main: Bernhard & Graefe Verlag für Werthwesen, 1965), pp. 20ff.


98 Stuokes, Hitler, p. 239.

99 The only significant attempts to put forward a structuralist/functionalist analysis of Nazi foreign policy were: a) Tim Mason’s explanation of the outbreak of war partly in terms of domestic pressures created by contradictions within the regime. See Mason, Sozialpolitik, pp. 208ff., and b) Wolfgang Schieder’s analysis of Germany’s intervention in the Spanish Civil War, in ‘Spanischer Bürgerkrieg und Vierjahresplan. Zur Struktur nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik’, in Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, ed. W. Michalka (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1978), pp. 325-59. However, Mason’s thesis has been substantially refuted, notably by Richard Overy in ‘Germany, Domestic Crisis and War in 1939’, Past and Present, 116 (1987), 138-68.


101 Ibid., pp. 1ff.

102 Ibid., pp. 18ff.

103 Ibid., pp. 31ff.


105 For the following, see Schleunes, Twisted Road, pp. 285ff.

106 U.D. Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972), p. 357.


111 Ibid., p. 7.


114 The best recent synthesis of work on the Nazi persecution of the Jews is P. Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1998). See also the essays by Browning and Pohl in this volume.


116 For a recent detailed analysis of Hitler’s role in the Holocaust, see P. Longerich, The Unwritten Order: Hitler’s Role in the Final Solution (Stroud: Sutton, 2001).