

Propaganda Ministry.⁶⁶ The Madagascar Project failed to address strategic realities Heydrich had already grasped. Any European solution to the Jewish question was not possible until (and unless) all the European Jews were in German hands. Millions in the East still were not. If and when they were, Germany's strategic disposition would facilitate the option of a "territorial Final Solution"—a more efficient, less expensive, and permanent way of dealing with the Jews once and for all. By August 1940, Heydrich was already thinking in these terms.

A Territorial Final Solution

Some six weeks earlier he had written to Ribbentrop, reminding the Foreign Minister that Jewish policy was the exclusive provenance of the RSHA and stating for the record why the solution to the Jewish Question was a police matter and not a foreign policy issue.⁶⁷ Citing his original authority from Göring in January 1939 to direct Jewish emigration from all German territories, Heydrich declared that Jewish emigration had proceeded successfully in the face of great difficulties and despite wartime conditions. "The *total* problem," he continued, "could no longer be solved through emigration since there were three-and-one-quarter million Jews in the areas *currently* under German control [meaning more were expected]. A territorial Final Solution would therefore be necessary." Heydrich closed by requesting to be notified by advance invitation "to any future discussions about the Final Solution to the Jewish Question," in the event they should be initiated by anyone other than himself.⁶⁸

In this context, given all that had come before and in view of what soon would follow, what did Heydrich mean by "a territorial Final Solution," and "the Final Solution to the Jewish Question"? Did he mean Madagascar, or did he mean what, in fact, the Final Solution became: extermination? If Heydrich was not excluding a Madagascar-like endeavor by ruling out emigration, which common sense and the tone of the document suggest,⁶⁹ then strategic decisions Hitler reached in the summer of 1940 effectively foreclosed all options except a territorial Final Solution on the continent of Europe.

In addition, significant developments initiated by Himmler, to which Heydrich was privy, pointed toward similar intentions for the Jews. In late May, the Reichsführer SS secured Hitler's endorsement for his memorandum on the future treatment of the alien populations in the East and the Führer's permission to circulate the document among a select, restricted group of top-level recipients.⁷⁰ The Himmler text refers to Jews only once, innocuously and in passing.⁷¹ This is because the paper had a broader purpose. The memorandum served to reassert and reinforce Himmler's authority as head of the RKFDV, the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom, as Hitler's resettlement commissar in the East.

Himmler had timed the approach to Hitler perfectly. The Führer's euphoria as the colossal victory in the West unfolded created just the right climate for grandiose rhetoric about the racial reordering of Europe. Himmler needed a boost to resolve the continuing challenges by the army and Hans Frank to his authority in deportation and resettlement matters in the East. In April 1940, Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger, the Higher SS and Police leader in the General Government, alerted Himmler to a series

of difficulties in resettlement matters involving the army, and to Frank's efforts to undermine or remove Odilo Globocnik, the ruthless, energetic SS and Police leader in the Lublin District of the General Government who was loyally devoted to both Krüger and Himmler.⁷² On the original of Krüger's letter, Himmler scribbled: "I claim supremacy in resettlement and will assert it during my trip to Lublin."⁷³

The reference was to his forthcoming two-day visit to Globocnik on May 5–6, 1940, during which Himmler discussed a range of issues with Krüger and Globocnik and inspected with great interest the SS units and facilities Globocnik commanded.⁷⁴ Globocnik was more aggressive and forceful even than Krüger in serving Himmler's interests in the General Government. Also, Globocnik's temperament and abilities resembled the qualities Himmler most admired and depended upon in Heydrich. He could be relied upon to get any job done without question or explanation.⁷⁵ Positioned in the most remote and isolated district of the General Government, Globocnik was the right man, in just the right place, to handle the big resettlement task Himmler was contemplating. After returning to Berlin, the Reichsführer SS supplied both Krüger and Ulrich Greifelt, Himmler's deputy as head of the RKFDV, with a terse, unequivocal written directive citing Hitler's decree vesting the SS with supreme authority for all resettlement actions.⁷⁶

As the summer progressed, there were clear signs that the discussion of SS racial policy, including measures against the Jews, had moved in tandem with the onset of strategic planning for war in the East. On August 10, 1940, after Heydrich had received the consultants' reports on the unsuitability of the Madagascar Plan,⁷⁷ Himmler convened an extraordinary meeting in the Prinz-Albrechts-Strasse, the only session of its kind recorded in his office calendar for the entire year.⁷⁸

At 11:00 A.M., eleven of the most senior and powerful figures in the SS and police sat down with Himmler for a meeting that lasted well into the afternoon. Because of their office or assignment, all were, or had been, directly involved in or with the planning for and conduct of anti-Jewish measures, racial policy, resettlement questions in the East, the concentration camps, the euthanasia program, and the Einsatzgruppen. The participants included Heydrich (RSHA); SS General Kurt Daluge (Chief of the Order Police); all five Higher SS and Police Leaders from the East: Jakob Sporrenberg, Richard Hildebrandt, Wilhelm Koppe, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, and Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger;⁷⁹ Ulrich Greifelt (RKFDV); Oswald Pohl (SS Budget and Construction Office and concentration camps); Otto Hoffmann (SS Race and Resettlement Office); and Karl Wolff, the chief of Himmler's office staff. There is no surviving record of what these men discussed.

The date and length of the meeting, as well as the unprecedented gathering of so many SS and police principals in a format Himmler disliked and invariably avoided, suggest a major conference dealing with the most important, sensitive, and far-reaching aspects of racial and resettlement planning and policy. Strong hints about the tone, if not the substance, of the meeting were recorded independently and shortly after the conference by two of the participants. Wilhelm Frick, the minister of the interior, wanted to extend the Nuremberg Race Laws to the annexed territories in the East. Himmler and Greifelt objected to this measure.⁸⁰ On August 21 Greifelt wrote to Frick, insisting that there was no need to introduce complicated racial legal-

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ities in the East to keep Poles and Jews from breeding, since "a final cleansing of the Jewish Question and the mixed-blood question was foreseen for after the war."⁸¹

In a file memorandum that he dictated three weeks later, on September 11, 1940, to Lammers, Martin Bormann, and Otto Hoffmann, Heydrich addressed the issue of how best to solve the problem of racial mixing and Germanization in Bohemia-Moravia.⁸² After recommending steps to sort out those racially fit to be Germanized from the elements of bad blood in the population, Heydrich rhetorically asked how Bohemia could then be racially cleansed in order to become entirely German. The answer, he concluded, was obvious: "one had to set the imaginary goal of evacuating those remaining Czechs to a currently imaginary government."⁸³ Little in the meaning was left to the imagination.

In the fall, planning activities directed toward the extermination of the Jews gathered momentum. Himmler received complaints about the masses of useless Jews in Poland who could not work, who were a constant danger, and who had to be dealt with.⁸⁴ Heydrich raised the possibility of eliminating the Jewish population in the Warsaw Ghetto through epidemics introduced by SS doctors.⁸⁵ There were new signs that Himmler and Heydrich were gaining the upper hand in their shoving match with Hans Frank over Jewish deportations to the General Government.⁸⁶ On November 2, 1940, Himmler secretly ordered Globocnik to proceed with the development of an SS preserve in the Lublin District—a self-sufficient, closed zone of SS industrial and construction enterprises, farmsteads, and military and training installations that would serve as the basis for the expansion of SS and police power in the East.⁸⁷

Heydrich kept busy with matters closer to home—internal measures and legal technicalities that needed ironing out before any deportation of Jews from the Reich. He was at least partially preoccupied with plans for even harsher economic and financial measures against the already impoverished German Jews, such as eliminating pension payments, confiscating property, and abolishing the remaining social benefits for German Jews with relatives who had emigrated.⁸⁸

Then, on December 18, 1940, Hitler signed the secret directive ordering the German attack on the Soviet Union in the coming spring.⁸⁹ That night, Himmler went alone to the Reich Chancellery for a long, private meeting with the Führer.⁹⁰ In the weeks that followed, the pace of activity in Himmler's office, and especially at the RSHA, quickened dramatically. At the RSHA, the planning for the coming racial and ideological war of annihilation proceeded in tandem with interesting—and supporting—parallel preparations.⁹¹

The Decision on the Final Solution

On December 14, 1940, Herbert Backe, the State Secretary who was the driving force in the Food and Agriculture Ministry, released a confidential report on the European food situation which created a stir throughout the top level of the Reich government.⁹² Citing critical shortages in the first wartime continental harvest, Backe drafted far-reaching plans for German rationing and for the wholesale confiscation of foodstuffs from throughout occupied Europe. The goal was to take enough from elsewhere to offset what otherwise would be disastrous shortages in meat and grains

available to the German population. Backe further concluded that the longer-term German food shortages could only be solved through an attack on the Soviet Union, followed by wholesale confiscation of Russian foodstuffs and livestock. Even if all the Russian food and agricultural resources became available to Germany and her allies, Backe concluded, the only way to guarantee a blockade-proof Nazi Europe would be to kill off millions of Russians by liquidation, starvation, or deportation.⁹³ Both Himmler and Heydrich studied the report, which evidently became the basis for Himmler's comments to senior SS leaders some weeks later that the coming war in the East would kill off 30 million people.⁹⁴

By early January 1941, Heydrich was already at work on a massive assignment. His task was the logical extension of two years of activity in planning and preparation. Its delegation was both a recognition and the natural outgrowth of his singular, cumulative experience in the development of anti-Jewish policy and the implementation of anti-Jewish measures. Consistent with his original authority from Göring two years earlier, he had been deputized through Himmler to prepare (for Hitler) proposals for a Final Solution to the Jewish Question. The documentation of the assignment—which was discovered, has been cited, and was generously made available to me by Richard Breitman—is in my estimation powerfully persuasive.⁹⁵ Two crucial pieces of evidence, left individually and in separate records by Heydrich subordinates in the RSHA, fit together in mutually authenticating context and are cemented by independent documents Heydrich himself created in entirely different circumstances.

The first document survived from the files of the Paris office of the Security Police and the SD in occupied France.⁹⁶ Its author was Theodor Dannecker, a Jewish affairs specialist in the RSHA and close associate of Adolf Eichmann, who had worked in the Central Emigration Offices in Vienna and Berlin before assignment to Paris from the RSHA in the fall of 1940. Assigned the task of creating a Central Jewish Office in Paris to exert RSHA authority in Jewish matters in occupied France and with the Vichy government, Dannecker staked out the strongest possible claim he could, based on what he already knew.⁹⁷ In an office memo dated January 21, 1941, Dannecker revealed that Hitler intended to bring about a final solution (endgültige Lösung) to the Jewish Question at the end of the war in all the areas of Europe that would be under German rule or control. The Führer had already assigned Heydrich, through Himmler and Göring, the task of preparing a final solution project (Endlösungsprojekt). On the basis of the extensive experience Heydrich's agencies had in Jewish affairs, and as a result of the long-standing preparatory work already done by the chief of the Security Police, the essential features of the project had been worked out and the plan had already been submitted to Hitler and Göring (that is, before January 21, 1941).⁹⁸

Dannecker went on to stress the magnitude of the task that lay ahead, the success of which would depend upon the most careful and extensive preparations for every phase of the operation—from the continuing tasks involved in totally removing or isolating the Jews to the planning for the individual resettlement actions, which would be carried out in territories still to be determined.⁹⁹ Given all that has long been known about the strategy applied to the Final Solution, the process of destruction, the contents of the Dannecker memorandum seem self-authenticating. Subse-

quent events in Berlin and the accuracy of the proposal.

As Breitman writes, on January 20, 1941, which Göring attended by Adolf Eichmann, he went to Hitler with an "outline" of the potential complications of the picture, he responded to the Minister.

Eichmann told Göring that the "final evacuation of the Jews" had been submitted a month earlier (January). But the proposal was not adopted at that moment because the evacuation of the Jew or Pole from the East would obviously refer to the implementation of Heydrich's draft proposal.

No copy of the proposal could survive him. The proposal can be reconstructed in language. Eichmann's memo of January 11, 1940, reflects expressions in the language of the "territorial Final Solution" in March 1940. Heydrich's thinking was more than the summer of 1940—murder—as the only solution and for all.

In November 1940, a startling and brutal proposal by Eduard Wagner, proposed Jewish measures in the East. Heydrich reminded his long-standing significance of the task entrusted with the proposal.

However careful the elliptical phrasing probably would have been, the planning and preparatory details might have been offered by several sources offer several

In all likelihood

quent events in Berlin would appear to confirm both the authenticity of the document and the accuracy of Dannecker's timing for Heydrich's completion and submission of the proposal to Hitler.

As Breitman first noted, the conference in the Propaganda Ministry on March 20, 1941, which Goebbels convened to discuss removing Jews from Berlin, was attended by Adolf Eichmann as the RSHA representative.¹⁰⁰ Goebbels proposed going to Hitler with an "evacuation proposal" for the Berlin Jews. Eichmann recognized the potential complications that such a step would cause. Understanding the larger picture, he responded to Goebbels by revealing enough to satisfy the Propaganda Minister.

Eichmann told those present that Hitler had commissioned Heydrich with the "final evacuation of the Jews" (endgültige Judenevakuierung), for which Heydrich had submitted a proposal to the Führer eight to ten weeks earlier (about mid-January). But the proposal, Eichmann continued, could not be carried out for the moment because the General Government was incapable of taking another single Jew or Pole from the old Reich.¹⁰¹ Eichmann's comments and Dannecker's memo obviously refer to the same plan or written recommendations and thus place Heydrich's draft proposal before Hitler at approximately the same time.

No copy of the Heydrich proposal has been found. The document doubtless did not survive him. The likely tone of the document and some of its probable contents can be reconstructed from several sources. The first are tied together by consistency in language. Eichmann's choice of words on March 20, 1941, Dannecker's language in the memo of January 21, and Heydrich's terminology in the file memo of September 11, 1940, reflect a descriptive uniformity consistent with Heydrich's own earlier expressions in the letter to Ribbentrop of June 24, 1940. The meaning of "final Jewish evacuation" in March 1941 was no different than Heydrich's intentional phrasing of "territorial Final Solution" and "Final Solution to the Jewish Question" in June 1940. Heydrich's thinking and planning, his grasp of evolving developments had, no later than the summer of 1940, been directed toward physical extermination—mass murder—as the only real, final solution that would get rid of the Jewish problem once and for all.

In November 1941 Heydrich spoke to the issue of his long-term perspective with startling and brutal honesty. In an angry letter to Army Quartermaster-General Eduard Wagner, protesting the lack of military cooperation in carrying out anti-Jewish measures in occupied France—that is, blowing up synagogues in Paris—Heydrich reminded the general and the army, in demanding closer cooperation, of his long-standing supremacy in Jewish matters by observing that the "political significance of the measures taken were fully clear to me, since years earlier I was entrusted with the preparation of the Final Solution in Europe."¹⁰²

However carefully the document for Hitler might have been composed, with elliptical phrasing and with the already familiar euphemisms, the tone and language probably would have conveyed the intent of destruction as the result of years of planning and preparation, as the outgrowth of cumulative experience. What specific details might have been identified in the proposal for Hitler to consider? Related sources offer several suggestions.

In all likelihood, many of the features later noted in the Wannsee Protocol could

have been outlined¹⁰³—Jewish census data, the combing of Europe from west to east, an outline of the transport requirements, forced labor, the need for full cooperation and assistance from the Reich ministries and from the foreign governments affected, and the plans for emptying the ghettos in accordance with the annotations from September 1939 for the evacuation of the Jews further to the East.¹⁰⁴

The details of destruction probably would have been left out, as a matter of tact, and because they were not clearly formulated in January 1941. It took the later experience of killing on so massive a scale to refine the ongoing planning and evolving procedures for extermination, just as the practical lessons of experience had proven so valuable in each of the preceding phases of anti-Jewish policy. There could have been at least two exceptions in the identification of detail in what Heydrich prepared for Hitler's review. Whether or not they were actually reduced to writing for the Führer to read, they seem to have been essential to Heydrich's thinking in January 1941.

The first issue, which we know Heydrich recognized, and addressed with his customary energy and determination, was the question of the masses of Russian Jews who would be caught as German armies overran the Soviet Union. These "Ostjuden," the lowest scum below the dregs of subhumanity, who were infected with the additional bacillus of bolshevism (and therefore most lethally dangerous) could be caught and eliminated swiftly by special SS units operating right behind the advancing armies. The most dangerous could be identified, sorted out and liquidated first, and the rest dealt with in extensive mopping-up operations that undoubtedly would be necessary after the Soviet collapse.¹⁰⁵ Given his pronouncements at the time about the nature of the coming struggle in the East, Hitler probably considered this the most fascinating and striking aspect of the proposal for a continental solution to the Jewish problem.¹⁰⁶

The Categorization of Concentration Camps and Auschwitz II

The larger issue which would not have escaped Hitler's critical scrutiny was the dilemma posed in dealing with the millions of Polish, German, and other European Jews, the great sedentary concentrations who were less isolated from the world than the Russian Jews, and who had been left in place in the countries allied with or overrun by Germany as the war passed them by. Here, too, there are indications of Heydrich's grasp of the issue, and hints of what he may have proposed in January of 1941.

On January 2, 1941, Heydrich sent out an order for the classification of the concentration camps.¹⁰⁷ The camps were to be divided into categories according to the danger posed by the prisoner—a kind of minimum, medium, and maximum security reordering of the concentration camps. In the future, the most dangerous enemies and arrestees would go to the worst camp, which was identified as Mauthausen. In category 2, the camps specified for serious offenders—but not the most severe political risks—were Buchenwald, Flossenbürg, Neuengamme, and Auschwitz II. There was, of course, no Auschwitz II at that time.¹⁰⁸

The reference to Auschwitz II on January 2, 1941, and in this context, is extremely interesting. Himmler had then not yet conferred with Rudolf Höss, the

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commandant of Auschwitz, about the expansion of the camp, and did not until two months later.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, there is no explanatory reference in the Heydrich document to Auschwitz II, only a routine mention. The decision to expand Auschwitz with a second camp had therefore already been made—at sometime before the end of 1940.

Had the construction of a second camp at Auschwitz already been discussed in some context before January 2, 1941? Obviously so, and undoubtedly in SS circles that included the recipients of the Heydrich directive: the RSHA principals in Berlin, the Security Police and SD commanders and inspectors in the East, the inspector-general of concentration camps, and all the concentration camp commandants.

Equally interesting is the careful but authoritative phrasing of the directive. Heydrich did not mince words; neither did he overstate or waste them. The opening paragraph does not say Himmler had ordered the classification of the camps by prisoner category; it states explicitly that “the Reichsführer SS has given his permission” for the classification,¹¹⁰ meaning the proposal came from Heydrich and had been approved by Himmler. Why would a proposal coming from Heydrich, on January 2, 1941, incorporating a reference to Auschwitz II as a concentration camp—the earliest such reference to have been found in the records—have been dispatched when it was, and why by Heydrich rather than Himmler?

Could this mean Heydrich had a special interest or specific reason to be interested in the construction of a second camp at Auschwitz? If Himmler had given his permission for the classification of the camps, he had also already given his permission for the development of Auschwitz II. Does this mean, then, that the initiative for what became Auschwitz II, the Birkenau death camp, originated with Heydrich? It seems possible, and more especially so in view of the recently discovered materials indicating the placement of SS orders for gassing equipment for the Auschwitz main camp in December 1940.¹¹¹

Heydrich had been keenly interested in the euthanasia gassings throughout 1940. He understood and was impressed by results. The achievements experienced in the numbers of victims eliminated, in some cases with RSHA assistance, clearly pointed to the desirability of gassing on an even larger scale in an enterprise as gigantic as a Final Solution would be. Though all the details still had to be worked out in planning and preparation, Heydrich would have grasped the general concept for mass killing as fundamentally sound. The techniques of the euthanasia program applied in a facility as remote, but as adaptable to expansion, and as accessible by rail as Auschwitz, would have been especially convincing as an early recommendation to Hitler for dealing once and for all with all the non-Russian Jews under German control.¹¹²

The best engineers take a general concept and from it formulate the plans for development, the specifics of design, and the related operating functions that enable the mechanism to work. And the most successful results of the best engineering come from years of planning and pragmatic adaptation. If Hitler was the author of the Final Solution, and Himmler its architect, then Reinhard Heydrich was both its design and construction engineer, whose abilities for transforming general concept into working reality were equaled, if not surpassed, by the brilliance of his qualities of executive instinct.

NOTES

1. The phraseology is in Hitler's "Political Testament," dictated less than twelve hours before his suicide. An English translation is in *Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945*, ed. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (New York, 1975), pp. 678-80. See also Eberhard Jäckel, *Hitler in History* (Hanover, NH, 1984). For summaries of the historical literature on the Holocaust, see Otto Dov Kulka, "Die Deutsche Geschichtsschreibung über den Nationalsozialismus und die 'Endlösung,'" *Historische Zeitschrift* 240 (1985): 599-640; Michael R. Marrus, "The History of the Holocaust: A Survey of Recent Literature," *Journal of Modern History* 59/1 (March 1987): 114-60; and idem, *The Holocaust in History* (New York, 1987). For differing views of Hitler's role, see Gerald Fleming, *Hitler and the Final Solution* (Berkeley, 1984); Christopher R. Browning, *Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution* (New York, 1985); and idem, *The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution* (Cambridge, 1992).

2. The best work is still Shlomo Aronson, *Reinhard Heydrich und die Frühgeschichte von Gestapo und SD* (Stuttgart, 1971). Other biographies to date include Charles Wighton, *Heydrich: Hitler's Most Evil Henchman* (Philadelphia, 1963); Günther Deschner, *Reinhard Heydrich: Statthalter der Totalen Macht* (Munich, 1980); and Edouard Calic, *Reinhard Heydrich: Schlüsselfigur des Dritten Reiches* (Stuttgart, 1984). On Heydrich and Himmler, and most aspects of their work, the best book in a generation is Richard Breitman, *The Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the Final Solution* (New York, 1991). Condensed documentary biographical details for Heydrich may be found in National Archives of the United States (hereafter NARUS), Record Group 319, Intelligence Document Series No. 921528; and *Archives of the Holocaust: The Berlin Document Center*, vol. 11, ed. Henry Friedlander and Sybil Milton (New York, 1992), pt. 1, pp. 336-41. Original documentation of Heydrich's responsibility for the Final Solution is in the Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK), RSHA/R/58, Heydrich to Walter Schmitt, Chief of the SS Personnel Office, January 25, 1942; and NARUS, T-175, reel 175, frame 2648487, letter of December 31, 1941, from Rudolf Brandt, Himmler's adjutant, to Oswald Pohl, chief of the SS Main Economic and Administrative Office.

3. Aronson, *Reinhard Heydrich*, chapter 1.

4. Hitler was particularly enraged and embittered by Heydrich's assassination, blaming Heydrich's own recklessness and bravado for depriving Nazi Germany—and Hitler—of a man who was invaluable. See *Hitler's Table Talk: Hitler's Conversations Recorded by Martin Bormann* (Oxford [paperback ed.], 1988), p. 512.

5. Richard Breitman and Shlomo Aronson, "Eine Unbekannte Himmler-Rede vom Januar 1943," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 2 (1990): 337-48. The speech, given on the occasion of Himmler's appointment of Ernst Kaltenbrunner as head of the RSHA, is an unusually frank and revealing summary of the Heydrich-Himmler relationship.

6. This is the theme in the extremely important article by Gustav von Schmoller, "Heydrich im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 4 (1979): 626-45, which documents the extensive, thorough planning Heydrich had undertaken prior to his appointment to Prague.

7. NARUS, T-120/780/372112-372114; Nuremberg Document NG-5764, copy of Göring's letter authorizing the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, and Heydrich's cover letter to Ribbentrop announcing his appointment and requesting cooperation from the Foreign Ministry.

8. This premature, unplanned effort to dump large numbers of Jews into the Lublin area of Poland is treated in Seev Goschen, "Eichmann und die Nisko-Aktion im Oktober 1939: Eine Fallstudie zur NS Judenpolitik in der letzten Etappe vor der Endlösung," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1 (1981): 74-96; and in Jonny Moser, "Nisko: The First Experiment in Deportation," *Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual* 2 (1985): 1-30.

9. Gerhard L. Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany*, vol. 2, *Starting World War II* (Chicago, 1980), pp. 313-535; and Anthony Read and David Fisher, *Kristallnacht: The Unleashing of the Holocaust* (New York, 1989), for the events and the aftermath of the pogrom.

10. The thesis is Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Deutschland: Eine neue europäische*

11. BAK, NS-19 SS Standarte Deutsches Reich, anticipates both Heydrich's description of the a Himmler speeches and Agnes Petersen and

12. NARUS, Re Heydrich's summary damage and casualty

13. NARUS, R conference. The impact Jewish policy, was fit the Jewish Question since of 1983.

14. NARUS, RG measures proposed *Genocide: Jews and S* 1986), pp. 145-56.

15. BAK, NS-19 16. In the mini that he had received way or another" (so reckoning of account Doc. 1816-PS.

17. The natura documentary, *Adolf*

18. See NARUS: document and made

19. Aly and He

20. Zentrale Sta: the Chief of the Secu discovered by Konrad copy cited.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid. Intere Protocol, a copy of *Reichssicherheitshau* pp. 142-47.

23. Helmut Kra 1938-1942 (Frankfu

24. A brief narr of the office chiefs an incident, see Alfred 1979).

25. Heydrich's September 7, 14, 21

26. NARUS, T-

27. NARUS, T- Commissioner for t Deutschen Volkstur *Resettlement and Pe*

10. The thesis is extensively developed and documented in the important recent study by Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, *Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung* (Hamburg, 1991), esp. pp. 27–31, 48–51.

11. BAK, NS-19/H.R. 5, "Gruppenführer Besprechung am 8.11.1938 im Führerheim der SS Standarte Deutschland," pp. 24–27 and 47 of the typescript. Himmler's phraseology anticipates both Hitler's rhetoric in the speech of January 30, 1939, and Himmler's later description of the annihilation of the Jews in his Posen speech of October 4, 1943. Both Himmler speeches are printed in full in *Heinrich Himmler Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945*, ed. Agnes Petersen and Bradley Smith (Frankfurt/M., 1974).

12. NARUS, Record Group 238, Nuremberg Doc. 3051-PS; Nuremberg Doc. 3058-PS is Heydrich's summary report to Göring of November 11, 1938, on the national extent of the damage and casualties resulting from the Reichskristallnacht.

13. NARUS, RG 238, Nuremberg Doc. 1816-PS, partial stenographic record of the conference. The importance of this document, in signaling the radical shift in German anti-Jewish policy, was first described by Robert Wolfe, "Nazi Paperwork for the Final Solution to the Jewish Question," unpub. paper delivered at the American Historical Association conference of 1983.

14. NARUS, RG 238, Nuremberg Doc. 1816-PS; Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 27–32. The measures proposed on November 12 and subsequently enacted are listed in *The Policies of Genocide: Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany*, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld (Boston, 1986), pp. 145–56.

15. BAK, NS-19/H.R.5, "Gruppenführer Besprechung," November 8, 1938.

16. In the ministerial conference on November 12, Göring declared to the participants that he had received instructions from Hitler that the Jewish problem was to be settled "one way or another" (so oder so), and announced that in the event of war, there would be "a great reckoning of accounts" (eine grosse Abrechnung) with the Jews; NARUS, RG 238, Nuremberg Doc. 1816-PS.

17. The natural sound portion of this section of the Reichstag speech is in the 1977 documentary, *Adolf Hitler: 1889–1945*, produced by WCVE-TV in Richmond, Virginia.

18. See NARUS, T-175/R84/2515243, for Himmler's notes. Breitman first discovered the document and made it available to me.

19. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, p. 31 and note.

20. Zentrale Staatsarchiv, AST, Berlin, copy of the conference summary from the files of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Amt III, dated March 1, 1939. The document was first discovered by Konrad Kwiet and given to Richard Breitman, who kindly provided me with the copy cited.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid. Interesting also is the similarity in German phraseology to the later Wannsee Protocol, a copy of which is reproduced in full in *Topographie des Terrors: Gestapo, SS und Reichssicherheitshauptamt auf dem Prinz-Albrecht-Gelände; Eine Dokumentation* (Berlin, 1987), pp. 142–47.

23. Helmut Krausnick, *Hitlers Einsatzgruppen: Die Truppen des Weltanschauungskrieges, 1938–1942* (Frankfurt/M., [Fischer paperback ed.] 1985), pp. 26–65.

24. A brief narrative of the expansion, an organizational chart of the RSHA, and profiles of the office chiefs are in *Topographie des Terrors*, pp. 70–80. For Heydrich's role in the Gleiwitz incident, see Alfred Spiess and Heiner Lichtenstein, *Das Unternehmen Tannenberg* (Munich, 1979).

25. Heydrich's RSHA office chiefs and Einsatzgruppen commanders conferences of September 7, 14, 21, and October 3, and 8, 1939, are in NARUS, T-175/239/2728499ff.

26. NARUS, T-175/239/2728513–2728515, "Amtschefbesprechung am 14.9.1939."

27. NARUS, T-175/239/2728236ff. Hitler signed a secret decree naming Himmler Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism (Reichskommissar für die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums) on October 7, 1939. See especially Robert L. Koehl, *RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939–1945: A History of the Reich Commission for the*

Strengthening of Germanism (Cambridge, MA, 1957). An English translation of the decree is in *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals*, vol. 13 (Washington, D.C., 1952), pp. 138–43 (hereafter TWC, Green Series). Article 1, paragraph 2 of the decree stipulates that Himmler will “eliminate the harmful influence of such alien parts of the population as constitute a danger to the Reich and the German community,” a euphemism for mass deportations and killings.

28. NARUS, T-175/239/2728236ff., “Amtschef und Einsatzgruppenleiter Besprechung vom 21.9.1939.” Two days earlier, on September 19, Heydrich had attended a conference called and presided over by Göring in his capacity as head of the Four Year Plan. The conferees included either Reich Ministers or State Secretaries concerned with the economic and demographic aspects of dividing up and exploiting conquered Poland. In the discussion of the fate of the populations in the annexed and occupied territories, Göring stipulated that all Jews living in Germany would be deported to these areas; see Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, p. 64.

29. NARUS, RG 238, Nuremberg Doc. 3363-PS, “Schnellbrief . . . Judenfrage im besetzten Gebiet,” dated September 21, 1939. An English translation is in TWC, Green Series, vol. 13, pp. 133–37.

30. *Ibid.*

31. NARUS, T-175/R588/705–706, “Sichtpunkte für das Sachgebiet Judentum zur Amtschefbesprechung,” dated December 19, 1939.

32. *Ibid.* The subject of the office chiefs’ meeting was “The Final Solution to the German Jewish Question.”

33. Breitman, in *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 58, 61, 62, 64–65, has demonstrated persuasively that the American consul general in Berlin, Raymond Geist, who was unusually well connected and well informed, had pieced together an exceptionally accurate picture of the future course of German anti-Jewish policy—that the collective weight of all the measures pointed to the eventual extermination of Germany’s Jews. Geist had so informed the State Department. Geist’s assumptions at the time are accurately reflected in the record of the interagency meeting of February 28, 1939, cited above, and in the language of the talking points for the RSHA office chiefs’ meeting on December 19. And though conclusive documentation is lacking, I am not persuaded that option 2 noted in the talking points does not mean “disposal” rather than “accommodation, or quartering.”

34. NARUS, T-175/R588/705–706.

35. *Topographie des Terrors*, p. 126, presents a photographic reproduction of the document entitled “Räumung in den Ostprovinzen”—evacuation into the eastern provinces.

36. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 133–34, notes 25 and 26.

37. TWC, Green Series, vol. 13, pp. 138–43.

38. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 74–79; NARUS, RG 238, Nuremberg Doc. 864-PS is the annotated record of Hitler’s major points during the meeting. Those attending were Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Hans Frank, Rudolf Hess, Himmler, Martin Bormann, Wilhelm Frick, Hans Lammers, and Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart, Frick’s State Secretary from the Interior Ministry.

39. Krausnick, *Einsatzgruppen*, pp. 60–62; and Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, chapter 5, pp. 105–15, are the best summaries of the Himmler-Heydrich conflict with the Army commanders. The dispute with the Army posed a particular dilemma for Heydrich, who could not divulge the fact that all SS measures in Poland had resulted from Hitler’s directives to kill off the entire leadership of the Polish nation. See Helmut Krausnick, “Hitler und die Morde in Polen: Ein Beitrag zum Konflikt zwischen Heer und SS um die Verwaltung der besetzten Gebiete,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 2 (1963): 196–208.

40. See Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 79–82, 93–104, for the most detailed description of the Himmler-Frank conflicts over deportation. See also NARUS, RG 238, Nuremberg Doc. 5322, for the summary record of the big conference Heydrich convened in Berlin on January 30, 1940, to discuss massive resettlements of Jews, Gypsies, and Poles to the East, and Polish forced laborers into Germany. The list of the forty-five participants and an English translation of the minutes of the meeting are in TWC, Green Series, vol. 4, pp. 855–61.

41. The crucial conference Göring, Himmler, Frank, and directing a halt to “resettlement of the into the general p
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42. The leading program a model for completed too early
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43. Breitman, Kraków in January the General Govern liquidation of the in

44. TWC, Gre Brandt.

45. Aly and He

46. TWC, Gre

47. Aly and He

48. Breitman, .

49. TWC, Gre

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51. Aly and He

52. Yitzhak A

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53. See Helmu

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54. NARUS, T

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55. NARUS, R

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56. BAK, R58/

October 24, 1939.

57. BAK, R58/

dated April 23, 19

58. Breitman,

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59. Christoph

41. The crucial event that temporarily halted Heydrich's deportation measures was the conference Göring convened at his Karinhall estate on February 12, 1940, attended by Himmler, Frank, and all the eastern Gauleiters. In taking Frank's side against Himmler, and in directing a halt to the deportations, Göring's specific criticism of the SS was that the "resettlement of the Jews" had to be more thoroughly planned and prepared, and incorporated into the general policies in the East. See *Trials of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany* (Nuremberg, 1946), vol 36, pp. 299–307 (hereafter TMWC, Blue Series), for the record of the conference; Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 98–101; Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, p. 65.

42. The leading scholar documenting the extensive influences that made the euthanasia program a model for the Final Solution is Henry Friedlander. The preparation of this essay was completed too early to benefit from the publication of his definitive work, *The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution* (Chapel Hill, 1995). See especially his chapter, "Euthanasia and the Final Solution," in *The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation*, ed. David Cesarani (London, 1993). See also the works by Ernst Klee, "Euthanasie" in *NS-Staat: Die "Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens"* (Frankfurt/M., 1985); and Benno Müller-Hill, *Murderous Science: Elimination by Scientific Selection of Jews, Gypsies, and Others in Germany, 1933–1945*, trans. George R. Fraser (Oxford, 1988), esp. pp. 22–65, for the background and general developments; and Robert Jay Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (New York, 1986), esp. pp. 45–144, for profiles of participants and the expansion of the killings to the concentration camps; and see also Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 89–92, for specific details involving Himmler, Heydrich, and RSHA personnel.

43. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 89–90, 94–96. During a trip Himmler made to Kraków in January 1940, Odilo Globocnik, the SS and Police Leader in the Lublin District of the General Government, regaled Himmler and his entourage with a descriptive account of his liquidation of the inmates of a Polish insane asylum several weeks earlier.

44. TWC, Green Series, vol. 1, pp. 796–98, 800, closing brief in the trial of SS Dr. Karl Brandt.

45. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 265–72; TWC, Green Series, vol. 1, pp. 796–806.

46. TWC, Green Series, vol. 1, pp. 796–800, 805–806, 842–45.

47. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 265–72.

48. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 102–103.

49. TWC, Green Series, vol. 1, pp. 796–99.

50. TWC, Green Series, vol. 1, Nuremberg Docs. NO-660 and NO-018, letter from Himmler to Viktor Brack of December 19, 1940.

51. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 271–72.

52. Yitzhak Arad, *Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camps* (Bloomington, 1987), pp. 16–17, documents the transfer of ninety-two men to the three death camps from the Führer Chancellery euthanasia program.

53. See Helmut Krausnick's chapter on the concentration camps in *Anatomie des SS Staates*, vol. 2 (Freiburg, 1965), esp. pp. 98–115.

54. NARUS, T-580/49/271ff., which Heydrich supplemented on September 20 with a further order specifying more detailed procedures for the arrest and liquidation of especially dangerous suspects; see NARUS, RG 238, Nuremberg Doc. NO-2263, Heydrich to all regional offices of the Security Police and SD, September 20, 1939.

55. NARUS, RG 238, Nuremberg Doc. NO-905, office file copy of specialists' meeting of September 26, 1939, original signed by Müller.

56. BAK, R58/1027, fol. 106 u.R.' file copy of the express letter dispatched by Müller on October 24, 1939.

57. BAK, R58/1027, fol. 128, copy of a file note for Gestapo office IVe5 by Kurt Lindow, dated April 23, 1940, and citing the Himmler order of March 9.

58. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 101, citing the dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Berlin to the Secretary of State, dated March 28, and recounting the information from the daily briefing for the foreign press on March 27.

59. Christopher R. Browning, *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study*

of *Referat III D of Abteilung Deutschland* (New York, 1978); Leni Yahil, "Madagascar—Phantom of a Solution for the Jewish Question," in *Jews and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe, 1918–1945*, ed. Bela Vago and George L. Mosse (New York, 1974); and Philip Friedman, *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust* (New York, 1980).

60. The Foreign Office had defined the objective of shipping all the European Jews to Madagascar as an urgent postwar task in a memorandum completed ten days before the first German troops entered Paris. Ribbentrop had then discussed Madagascar in some detail with his Italian counterpart, Count Galeazzo Ciano, at a conference in Munich on June 17, 1940—prompting reaction from Heydrich and the RSHA (NARUS, T-120/780/37218, Foreign Office memo of June 3, 1940, "New and Urgent Tasks of Referat DIII[Inland]"). See also chapters 1 and 2 in Browning, *Final Solution*. NARUS, T-120/780/372104–372105, is the early draft of the Foreign Ministry's Madagascar Plan.

61. NARUS, T-120/780/372056–372071, "RSHA–Madagascar Projekt," which is undated but obviously followed by some weeks the Foreign Office version of the proposal.

62. NARUS, T-120/780/372104–372105 and 372056–372071, the Foreign Office and RSHA versions of a Madagascar Plan.

63. The RSHA version estimated 120 ships would be required to handle the deportations. Each ship would need sixty days for the round-trip voyage from Europe to Madagascar. Two ships would depart Europe every day, carrying an average of fifteen hundred Jews each, or about twenty thousand Jews per week. At that rate, the RSHA version arrived at the estimate of four years to complete the deportation of more than three million Jews to Madagascar.

64. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 257–65, deal extensively with the activities related to the Madagascar Project during the summer of 1940 among the various agencies involved—the Foreign Office, the RSHA, the Four Year Plan, and the Propaganda Ministry. Stressing the wholly unrealistic assumptions in the drafts of the plans, and the growing importance of economic planning for further conquest and exploitation, they conclude that Madagascar was an impractical exercise that served to camouflage the real consensus among all those involved—namely, that the Jews could disappear during the coming war of annihilation that would guarantee the economic future of the Reich.

65. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 262–65. The two expert consultants were Professor Friedrich Schumacher, a geologist from the mining institute at Freiburg in Saxony, and Professor Friedrich Burgdörfer, a population specialist and demographics expert who was then president of the Bavarian office of vital statistics.

66. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 261–63, also document the extensive involvement of principals from the Führer Chancellery—the euthanasia program—in the Madagascar discussions. Viktor Brack met with the Foreign Office planners and offered his own transport organization for use in getting the Jews to the ports. And earlier, on June 23, 1940, Philipp Bouhler, Brack's superior, who was running the euthanasia program, had approached Hitler and been rebuffed in his desire to become the German Governor General of East Africa.

67. NARUS, T-120/780/372047, Heydrich to Ribbentrop, dated June 24, 1940, and addressed to the Foreign Minister as "SS Gruppenführer Joachim von Ribbentrop."

68. *Ibid.*

69. There was a definite substantive basis for Heydrich's letter to Ribbentrop. That he was reacting critically to what he already knew of the Foreign Ministry's Madagascar proposal—the office memo of June 3—is strongly suggested by his use of statistics, his estimates for the number of Jews that then temporarily constituted the problem. He would not have written such a letter to Ribbentrop simply because he had learned that the Foreign Minister discussed the Jewish Question with Count Ciano on June 17. Nor would he have dispatched such a letter to Ribbentrop without Himmler's consent. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 277 note 46, cites documentation suggesting Ribbentrop had instructed the Foreign Office planners to work closely with Himmler's office, which would mean providing Himmler and Heydrich with the office memo of June 3. In all likelihood, Heydrich received and studied the Foreign Office paper of June 3 by no later than the middle of the month, prompting the response to Ribbentrop of June 24.

70. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 277 note 46, instructions for its English, the document NO-1881, pp. 147–

71. TWC, Gre

72. NARUS, T-120/780/372104–372105, and enclosing a top army about the cre would require the r West also provided Government to agr elements in the pop Deutschen General 1940."

73. NARUS, T-

74. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 112/2637798. The b Peter R. Black, "Re Central European H

75. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 277 note 46,

76. NARUS, T-120/780/372104–372105, additional problems that it went withou (NARUS, T-175/84/

77. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 257–65, practical aspects of Final Solution. On working on Madaga the purpose of appr In addition, the For of their citizenship neously forcing the: 372104–372105; Al

78. NARUS, R-120/780/372104–372105, Breitman generously my attention to the 1940.

79. For concise the best treatment of standard study by R *Reich und in den bes*

80. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 277 note 46,

81. *Ibid.*, p. 138

82. State Cent Böhmen und Mähr NNMN. Though H Reichsprotector in Higher SS and Polic

83. *Ibid.*, "Akte

84. Berlin Docu Bach-Zelewski, the office staff, dated Se

85. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 277 note 46, the SS, Dr. Ernst G

70. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 117–20, citing Himmler's memorandum and the instructions for its distribution, which are in NARUS, T-175/119/2645113–2645121. In English, the documents are in TWC, Green Series, vol. 13, Nuremberg Docs. NO-1880 and NO-1881, pp. 147–51.

71. TWC, Green Series, vol. 13, Nuremberg Doc. NO-1880, p. 148.

72. NARUS, T-175/128/2654343–2654348, Krüger to Himmler, dated April 15, 1940, and enclosing a top secret report on discussions held on April 4 with representatives from the army about the creation of military training preserves in the General Government, which would require the massive deportation and relocation of Polish civilians. The victory in the West also provided perfect cover for Hans Frank and the SS principals in the General Government to agree upon a massive campaign to exterminate the Polish resistance and all elements in the population hostile to German rule. See NARUS, RG 238, Diensttagebuch des Deutschen General Gouverneurs von Polen, "Polizei-Sitzung am Donnerstag, den 30. Mai 1940."

73. NARUS, T-175/128/2654343.

74. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 103–104; Himmler's itinerary is in NARUS, T-175/112/2637798. The best published summary of Globocnik's activities is the important article by Peter R. Black, "Rehearsal for 'Reinhard'? Odilo Globocnik and the Lublin Selbstschutz," *Central European History* 25/2 (March 1989): 204–26.

75. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 103–104, 129–30.

76. NARUS, T-175/128/2654341. On July 9, 1940, responding to Krüger's warnings of additional problems that Frank's people were creating for Globocnik, Himmler wrote Krüger that it went without saying that he would never consent to Globocnik's transfer or removal (NARUS, T-175/84/2609848).

77. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, p. 263. Officials in the Foreign Ministry were still discussing practical aspects of the Madagascar Project that would prove essential as procedures in the Final Solution. On August 12, Franz Rademacher, the leader of the Foreign Ministry group working on Madagascar, drafted a memo proposing the creation of an inter-European bank for the purpose of appraising, confiscating and utilizing all Jewish property throughout Europe. In addition, the Foreign Office version also urged enacting laws that would strip German Jews of their citizenship from the time and point of origin of their deportation, while simultaneously forcing them to sign over their remaining property to the Reich (NARUS, T-120/780/372104–372105; Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, p. 66 note 93).

78. NARUS, RG 242, T-581/R38A, is Himmler's appointment book for 1940. Richard Breitman generously provided me with his copies of Himmler's office calendar and first drew my attention to the probable significance of the meeting noted for the morning of August 10, 1940.

79. For concise but thorough biographical information on these five participants, and for the best treatment of the role and activities of all the Higher SS and Police Leaders, see the standard study by Ruth-Bettina Birn, *Die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer: Himmler's Vertreter im Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten* (Düsseldorf, 1986).

80. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 137–38.

81. *Ibid.* p. 138, and NARUS, RG 238, Nuremberg Doc. NG-1916.

82. State Central Archives, Prague, Akten des Stellvertretenden Reichsprotektors von Böhmen und Mähren, with a microfilm copy now deposited in the National Archives as NNMN. Though Heydrich wrote this file memorandum a year before his appointment as Reichsprotektor in Prague, this copy survived from the files of Karl Hermann Frank, the Higher SS and Police Leader for Bohemia-Moravia in 1940 and a close associate of Heydrich.

83. *Ibid.*, "Aktennotiz, Berlin, den 11. September 1940."

84. Berlin Document Center, SS Personalakte Bach-Zelewski, letter from Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Silesia, to Karl Wolff, Chief of Himmler's office staff, dated September 13, 1940 (hereafter BDC, by individual SS personnel file).

85. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 139. Heydrich approached the chief physician of the SS, Dr. Ernst Grawitz, to inquire if the undertaking would be feasible.

86. On October 2, 1940, Hitler had lunch in the Chancellery with Hans Frank, the Gauleiters Baldur von Schirach of Vienna, Erich Koch of East Prussia, and Martin Bormann. Bormann made a record of the conversation. During lunch, Schirach and Koch complained because Frank would not permit deportations of Jews into the General Government. Frank argued back. Hitler took the side of the Gauleiters, declaring he didn't care how dense the population in the General Government became, citing the per square kilometer population statistics for the Palatinate and Saxony as examples. Frank would simply have to take in more Jews. Bormann's record is in TMWC, Blue Series, vol. 39, pp. 425-30. See also Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 282-84.

87. BDC, Globocnik SS personnel file, undated cover letter enclosing a report subsequently written for Himmler and citing the order from the Reichsführer SS of November 2, 1940.

88. NARUS, T-175/204/00812-00814, Heydrich's memorandum for Robert Ley, head of the German Labor Front and Reich Minister of Labor, arguing for a number of additional legal and financial measures against the Jews. That same day, Heydrich received an extremely interesting letter from Gottlob Berger, chief of the SS recruiting office, calling attention to confusion over RSHA policy in Belgium. Berger was astonished to learn that an SD officer, he assumed with Heydrich's blessing, had just agreed to work with the Foreign Ministry in developing the pro-German Rexist Party to be led by Leon Degrelle. Berger requested clarification from Heydrich, since he thought they both had agreed that it simply would not be possible to work with the Foreign Ministry and Degrelle in carrying out the great tasks the Führer had assigned Himmler on behalf of the ethnic Germans and the Germanic peoples. NARUS, T-139/36/889-890, also as RG-238, Nuremberg Doc. NG-3481. I am indebted to Richard Breitman for calling this document to my attention.

89. In English, the text of the directive is in *Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945*, ed. Noakes and Pridham, pp. 593-94. As the historian Eberhard Jäckel noted in *Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power*, trans. Herbert Arnold (Middletown, CT, 1972), pp. 25-46, the decision to attack and destroy the Soviet Union was the critical step Hitler took to weave together closely his long-standing, unchanging objective of winning living space in the East, his ideological goal of annihilating the plague of communism, and his racial obsession to solve once and for all the European Jewish question.

90. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 146, for Hitler's and Himmler's activities on December 18, and for Himmler's evening visit to the Chancellery.

91. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 366-70.

92. *Ibid.*, pp. 368-70, for the contents of Backe's report and its release and circulation. Backe's work and abilities were well known to Himmler, and Backe evidently had a friendly relationship with Heydrich. Eleven months earlier, on January 3 and 9, 1940, Backe had visited Himmler's office to discuss matters related to the food situation. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, pp. 95 and 271 note 45, documents Backe's visits to Himmler's office.

93. Aly and Heim, *Vordenker*, pp. 368-70; Backe's testimony at the Nuremberg Trials, in TMWC, Blue Series, vol. 36, pp. 135-37.

94. At Nuremberg, Backe confused the time for his briefing of Himmler, placing their discussion in the early spring of 1941. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 147, documents the approximate time for Himmler's meeting with senior SS leaders at the Wewelsburg castle as January, meaning the Himmler-Backe meeting had to be earlier, since Himmler quoted the figures Backe estimated for the number of deaths among the alien peoples during the coming war in the east.

95. Breitman's unpublished paper, "Himmler and the Planning for the Final Solution," presented at the annual meeting of the German Studies Association in Bethesda, Maryland, October 2, 1993.

96. "Zentrales Judenamt in Paris," dated January 21, 1941, a copy made from the original of the Dannecker memorandum. The document, which is now deposited with other captured RSHA materials in the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris, has been reproduced by Dr. Serge Klarsfeld in his book *Vichy-Auschwitz: Die Zusammenarbeit der deutschen und französischen Behörden bei der "Endlösung der Judenfrage" in Frankreich*, trans.

Ahlich Meyer (No document's existence indebted to both original document.

97. For Dannecker: *Solution: Communal* 56, 58-77, and 79-80. RSHA in Berlin. He complete a Jewish responsible to him. express letter to the

98. Dannecker dated January 21, 1940.

99. *Ibid.* Dannecker Final Solution. On France, General OT concentration camp cited as his authority the creation of special as well as for all Jews reproduced in Klar 1940, Himmler had duration of the war

100. Breitman, German Ministry, "B NARUS, T-81/676/2 101. NARUS, "

102. The quote 6, 1941. Field Mars read and initialed V Special Investigative government for the with the Paris office

103. The full English, it may be from Hilberg (Chicago, "

104. The Heydrich

105. On the Einsatzgruppen in and the more recent *Einsatzgruppen of the East* 11-50. At his postwar close to Heydrich in 1941, both the persons begin planning for *Hitler's Einsatzgruppen*

106. See especially from the speech Hitler 30, 1941. Hitler not stand in the way of communist intellig Halder's notes are in

107. NARUS, "concentrationlager," date 108. *Ibid.*

Ahlich Meyer (Nördlingen, 1989), pp. 361–63. John Fox advised Richard Breitman of the document's existence and significance, and Breitman, in turn, made it available to me. I am indebted to both of them and to Serge Klarsfeld for providing me with a facsimile of the original document.

97. For Dannecker's activities in Paris, see Jacques Adler, *The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution: Communal Response and Internal Conflicts, 1940–1944* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 12, 13, 44, 56, 58–77, and 79–80. Dannecker was obviously abreast of the most advanced planning at the RSHA in Berlin. He spent the late autumn of 1940 and the winter months of 1941 in efforts to complete a Jewish census and to get the Jews organized under a Council of Elders directly responsible to him. He was following the model Heydrich had established for Poland in the express letter to the Einsatzgruppen commanders on September 21, 1939.

98. Dannecker memorandum on the establishment of the Jewish Central Office in Paris, dated January 21, 1941.

99. Ibid. Dannecker wasted no time in planning and preparing for the French phase of the Final Solution. On January 28, 1941, he wrote to the Chief of the Military Government in France, General Otto von Stülpnagel, demanding the army's assistance in the establishment of concentration camps for the 100,000 Jews he estimated were living in and around Paris. He cited as his authority a directive from Himmler and Heydrich of October 30, 1940, ordering the creation of special concentration camps in all the occupied territories for all foreign Jews, as well as for all Jews of German, Austrian, Czech and Polish nationality. This document is reproduced in Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz*, pp. 363–64. Since six months earlier, in March 1940, Himmler had forbidden the release of any Jews from concentration camps for the duration of the war; there could have been little doubt as to their eventual fate.

100. Breitman, *Architect of Genocide*, p. 152. The notes from the meeting in the Propaganda Ministry, "Betrifft: Evakuierung der Juden aus Berlin," of March 20, 1941, are in NARUS, T-81/676/5485604–5485605.

101. NARUS, T-81/676/5485604.

102. The quote is from the third page of the letter, Heydrich to Wagner, dated November 6, 1941. Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, then still Commander-in-Chief of the Army, read and initialed Wagner's copy of the letter. This document was provided by the Office of Special Investigations in the U.S. Department of Justice from materials collected by the French government for the postwar investigation and trials of French nationals who had collaborated with the Paris office of the RSHA in anti-Jewish violence.

103. The full text in German is reprinted in *Topographie des Terrors*, pp. 142–46; in English, it may be found in *Documents of Destruction: Germany and Jewry 1933–1945*, ed. Raul Hilberg (Chicago, 1971), pp. 89–99.

104. The Heydrich express letter of September 21, 1939, cited in note 29, above.

105. On the planning and preparations for the organization and deployment of Einsatzgruppen in the Russian campaign, see Krausnick, *Hitlers Einsatzgruppen*, pp. 89–150, and the more recent study, Ronald Headland, *Messages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security Service* (East Rutherford, NJ, 1992), pp. 11–50. At his postwar German trial, in Hamburg in 1973, Bruno Streckenbach, a subordinate close to Heydrich who was head of Amt I (personnel) in the RSHA, testified that in January 1941, both the personnel and administrative office (Amt II) received orders from Heydrich to begin planning for a huge Einsatzgruppen operation over a broad area. Cited in Krausnick, *Hitlers Einsatzgruppen*, p. 121.

106. See especially the notes recorded for his diary by Colonel-General Franz Halder from the speech Hitler delivered to the assembled commanders of the Armed Forces on March 30, 1941. Hitler noted that the army would have to put traditional values aside and let nothing stand in the way of the extermination of bolshevism, including the complete liquidation of the communist intelligentsia and all the political commissars attached to units of the Red Army. Halder's notes are reprinted in *Documents on Nazism*, ed. Noakes and Pridham, pp. 619–20.

107. NARUS, RG 238, Nuremberg Doc. NO-743, "Betrifft: Einstufung der Konzentrationslager," dated Berlin, January 2, 1941.

108. Ibid.

